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RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE:  






The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide a comprehensive 
overview of the Residential Communities Initiative within the US Army.  This project 
was conducted with the assistance of the Monterey Bay Housing Program Executive 
Office and the Program Manager for Residential Communities Initiative.  The goal of this 
project was to analyze this initiative and compare the way the Army is privatizing 
housing with the initiatives that the US Navy and US Air Force are utilizing.  We also 
wanted to use Monterey Bay as a case study to investigate how RCI was instituted at an 
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          Military housing is in trouble.  Chronic under funding for military housing 
has left the Department of Defense with a $16 billion housing repair bill for 177,000 
inadequate housing units.  The Army alone has a $7 billion revitalization deficit.  The 
Army estimates that 70% of its housing units need extensive renovation or complete 
replacement.  However, stable or declining military budgets, especially Military 
Construction (MILCON) budgets, offer no relief.  Congress is unlikely to appropriate the 
$7 billion, and the services are unlikely to forsake important weapons systems in favor of 
constructing houses. 
The second chapter reviews the historical context of military family housing, from 
the Revolutionary War period to present day.  The third chapter presents the Military 
Housing Privatization Initiative and its alternative authorizations.  It will discuss the 
Army, Navy and Air Force’s approach to privatization and how each services utilizes the 
twelve alternative authorizations to improve the housing of its members.   
The fourth chapter reviews the Residential Communities Initiative on the 
Monterey Peninsula.  It will discuss the stakeholders involved in the process, the change 
management techniques used, and the source selection process followed by the RCI 
office. 
RCI will work at the sites where there is considerable competition from private-
sector housing.  At those sites the commercial marketplace will require that the RCI 
corporations produce and maintain acceptable family housing.  Otherwise, Army families 
will simply choose to live elsewhere.  BAH, which reflects actual costs of housing in 
specific locations, will give them the resources to choose the private sector.   
             RCI will also probably work at more isolated sites.  The RCI corporations will 
probably produce the required number of family housing units.  The issue at such sites 
will be the quality of the housing, the maintenance, and the associated amenities.  The 
Government participation in the corporations will tend to keep quality at an acceptable 
level, mitigating the worst abuses of the monopolies.  Without competition, it seems 



























I. INTRODUCTION   
A. THE PROBLEM 
Military housing is in trouble.  Chronic under funding for military housing has left 
the Department of Defense with a $16 billion housing repair bill for 177,000 inadequate 
housing units.  The Army alone has a $7 billion revitalization deficit.  The Army 
estimates that 70% of its housing units need extensive renovation or complete 
replacement.  However, stable or declining military budgets, especially Military 
Construction (MILCON) budgets, offer no relief.  Congress is unlikely to appropriate the 
$7 billion, and the services are unlikely to forsake important weapons systems in favor of 
constructing houses.  As President Bush stated in a speech to military personnel,  
No aspect of our current defense posture is more worrisome than the decline in 
the standard of living of our service members and their families that has taken 
place in recent years.  Reversing this trend and improving their quality of life is a 
principle authority of my Administration.  We owe you and your families a decent 
quality of life. (Clark, 2003) 
During the past four decades, housing for military personnel and their families has 
been a relatively low priority.  After a rapid expansion of what was then considered 
modern and up-to-date accommodations throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the effort and 
funding devoted to the construction and the upkeep of military housing did not keep up 
with the natural deterioration and changing societal definitions of adequate housing.  The 
decrease in quality accelerated since the end of the Cold War as a result of the 
uncertainties of base closures, both at home and overseas, and shrinking defense budgets, 
which have encouraged the channeling of construction funds into projects more related to 
operational readiness.   (Else, 2001) 
Approximately one-third of military families live in government-owned housing, 
with the remainder living in privately owned homes or rental accommodations.  Of the 
one-third, DoD determined that more than half of their homes do not meet its current 
housing standards with regard to space and amenities.  The Department calculated that, 
by using its traditional methods of contracting and construction, it would need 30 years 
and $16 billion to resolve its family housing shortfall.  (Else, 2001) 
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Traditionally, DoD uses a combination of two methods to house active duty 
personnel and their families.  The principal method is reliance on the commercial housing 
supply near military installations: for which Congress provides members with a cash 
allowance to defray most of the cost.  Over the years this cash allowance lagged behind 
rental costs in such high-cost areas as Monterey, California.  Recognizing this shortfall, 
the current administration is committed to closing the gap between housing allowances 
and rental costs.  As President Bush proclaimed in his fiscal year 2002 Management 
Agenda, published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
The Administration is committed to reducing to zero by 2005, the average out-of-
pocket expense of military families living in private housing in local 
communities. This will enable more military families to leave inadequate 
government housing and rent quality private-sector housing in the local 
communities around DoD’s installations. 
The second method, intended for those locations where local housing is extraordinarily 
expensive or unavailable, is lodging members and their families in quarters built with 
appropriated funds on military reservations.  (Else, 2001) 
In 1996, Congress offered DoD a third housing method—the Military housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI).  MHPI was created in Section 2801 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 1996 (PL104-106) as a five-year pilot program within a 
10-year plan to resolve the general military housing problem.  Through the use of its 
alternative authorizations, Congress intended to improve military housing quickly and 
economically by leveraging the federal investment by encouraging private investment.  
This project examines how the services, especially the Army, implemented MHPI.  
Furthermore, this project will take a close look at how the Army implemented this 
initiative in and around Monterey, California.     
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 This paper will provide a brief history of housing in the military and the need for 
change.  The Army chose to adopt a housing policy they call the Residential 
Communities Initiative (RCI).  We will discuss how the leaders of the Army decided on 
this policy, the process used to select contractors as housing partners, the roadblocks to 
change, and the implementing strategies utilized by the Army to implement this change 
focusing on the Presidio of Monterey/Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.   
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Given inadequate funding to repair and rebuild military family housing, 
how will the Army accomplish the required revitalization? 
• How did the Army transfer housing to public-private housing corporations 
while maintaining oversight and ensuring the men, women and their 
families receive adequate housing?   
• What is the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), and what 
distinguishes it from other military housing programs? 
• How did the leaders in the Army decide on the Residential Communities 
Initiative? 
• How did Monterey’s RCI Program Manager implement the Residential 
Communities Initiative at the Presidio of Monterey, the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and Fort Ord military community? 
• What can the Army learn from the way other services are implementing 
the Military Housing Privatization Initiative? 
• What impact might privatized housing have on retention rates? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1.  Scope 
• Review the history of military housing. 
• Review the Military Housing Privatization Initiative and the authority 
given to each service. 
• Review the programs each service adopted under MHPI and look at 
several examples of programs already under way. 
• Analyze the Residential Communities Initiative’s acquisition process and 
consider whether it will provide the best value housing to the Army. 
• Review and analyze the Army’s Residential Communities Initiative 
program on the Monterey Peninsula. 
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2.  Limitations 
 While this project includes information on all of the services, it is not intended to 
be a detailed analysis of the Navy/Marine Corps or Air Force’s housing privatization 
initiatives.  Rather, it will compare those service’s housing initiatives to the Army’s 
Residential Communities Initiative.  Also, financial data, including profit margins are 
sensitive information.  The Army’s RCI offices consider this information to be 
proprietary and, therefore are reluctant to make it available.   
3.  Assumptions 
There are several assumptions critical to this project. 
• While the military forces’ size and structure continually fluctuate, 
manning levels will not increase or decrease by more than 20%.  
• Congress will not appropriate the $7 billion needed to provide adequate 
housing in the next five to ten years due to the costs associated with the 
war on terrorism as well as future weapon systems. 
• While OMB and Congressional interpretations of Budget Scoring will 
evolve, they will not change enough to seriously affect the DoD’s 
approaches to housing privatization. 
• Military installations can be grouped logically for multiple awards using a 
single solicitation. 
• Industry will continue to participate in this new approach regardless of the 
installations’ locations.  However, it is recognized some locations may be 
more desirable than others and that location may impact/affect negotiated 
contract terms and conditions. 
• Basic Allowance for Housing will continue to be authorized by Congress 
and will keep pace with housing costs. 
• Pressures from the commercial housing market will ensure that public-
private housing corporations build and maintain adequate military 
housing. 
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• In those locations where the commercial housing market is inadequate to 
ensure the performance of public-private housing corporations, other 
mechanisms can be constructed to ensure such performance. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 This project is based on an extensive literature review, including Congressional 
testimonies, Federal agency reports from both the Congressional Research Service and 
the General Accounting Office, Defense Department and Service component regulations, 
reports, journal articles, written texts, extensive MHPI and RCI websites, web searches, 
previous thesis’, and interviews conducted with MHPI program personnel as well as 
service component personnel.  
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 See Appendix A 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 This project is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II provides a historical 
context for how military family housing originated and progressed through the Cold War.  
It also includes an overview of traditional MILCON-funded housing programs and three 
previous military family housing privatization programs.  Chapter III details the origin 
and scope of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative and the programs each of the 
services adopted under this initiative, to include the acquisition process utilized by each 
service.  Chapter IV looks at the Residential Communities Initiative program at the 
Presidio of Monterey/Naval Postgraduate School and details the change and acquisition 
process from military housing to privatized housing.  It discusses change management 
techniques utilized by the program office and military leaders as well as the acquisition 
process.  Chapter V provides our independent analysis of the Army’s privatization 
program and whether this program will provide the Army and its service members and 












Figure 1 - 1:  Artist’s Rendering of the Ord Military Community under RCI 
 
Source:  From Monterey RCI website 
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II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.    INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the historical context of military family housing, from the 
Revolutionary War period to present day.  It includes overviews of the Quartering Acts, 
the U.S. Constitution’s Third Amendment, housing the military from 1790 thru World 
War II, the Cold War era military family housing programs, legislative effects on Cold 
War housing programs and eligibility criteria to live in military family housing. 
B.  WHY DOD PROVIDES MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING 
1.  The Quartering Acts 
The Quartering Act of 1765 required colonial governments and citizenry to 
provide housing and expendable supplies to British troops stationed in the American 
Colonies. Where sufficient barracks were not available, troops were to be housed in 
privately owned structures. Specifically, the act stated that … civil officers … are hereby 
required to billet and quarter the officers and soldiers, in barracks provided by the 
colonies; and if there shall not be sufficient room in the said barracks for the officers and 
soldiers, then and in such case only, to quarter and billet the residue of such officers and 
soldiers for whom there shall be no room in such barracks, in inns, livery stables, ale 
houses, victual ling houses, and the houses of sellers of wine by retail to be drank in their 
own houses or in places thereunto belonging, and all houses of persons selling of rum, 
brandy, strong water, cyder or metheglin … uninhabited houses, outhouses, barns, or 
other buildings, as shall be necessary, to quarter therein the residue of such officers and 
soldiers for whom there should not be room in such barracks and publick [sic] houses as 
aforesaid …(Quartering Act of 1765) 
The Quartering Act of 1774 was similar in substance to the 1765 Act, stating that 
… where no barracks are provided by the colonies … officers or soldiers in His 
Majesty’s service shall remain within any of the said colonies without quarters for the 
space of twenty-four hours after such quarters shall have been demanded, it shall and 
may be lawful for the governor of the province to order and direct such and so many 
uninhabited houses, outhouses, barns, or other buildings as he shall think necessary to be 
taken (making reasonable allowances for the same) and make fit for the reception of such 
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officers and soldiers, and to put and quarter such officers and soldiers therein for such 
time as he shall think proper. However, this new Quartering Act allowed for the billeting 
of troops in occupied dwellings. (Quartering Act of 1774)   
The Quartering Acts were part of a set of Parliamentary decrees, known as the 
“Intolerable Acts” that incensed colonists’ anger toward King George, substantially 
contributing to the revolutionary movement, and left an enduring scar on the colonial 
political leaders. 
2.  United States Constitution, Amendment 3 
Amendment three to the U.S. Constitution states, “No soldier shall, in time of 
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but 
in a manner to be prescribed by law.”  Fifteen years after the second quartering act, 
preventing the forcible housing of soldiers by private citizens was still paramount to the 
constitutional writers. They ensured that private citizens and property owners could not 
be required to house soldiers except by passage of congressional legislation during 
wartime. This amendment forced the Secretary of War to provide organic housing for 
military forces, and not rely on the private rental market. It guided military personnel 
housing policy for over 150 years. 
Not until the Capehart program ended in the early 1960s did DoD recognize that it 
would never attain its goal of providing housing for all military families. The local 
economy surrounding military installations became the primary housing source, funded 
by housing allowances, and on-base housing became secondary. 
3.  Housing the Military Prior to World War II 
Before the Cold War, on-base (or shipboard) housing was the norm for personnel 
during peacetime and housing allowances played a limited role compared to today. For 
the married members of the small peacetime officer corps, this meant on-base DoD 
family housing.  For enlisted personnel, who were not expected to have families, it meant 
assignment to barracks living quarters. Although married men could be drafted into the 
enlisted force during wartime, they were expected to leave their dependants at home. The 
U.S. Court of Claims even used the notion that DoD housing was the norm for military 
personnel in 1925 to confirm the tax-free status of housing allowance. In the court’s 
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view, allowances were not taxable compensation but simply reimbursement for an 
expense. (CBO, 1993) 
As late as 1948, the Hook Commission, an advisory group appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense, assumed that sufficient DoD housing would eventually be available 
to house most military families in peacetime, and that allowances for housing would be 
the exception rather than the norm in the post-WW-II era.  To support that assumption, 
members of the commission argued that military personnel preferred DoD housing 
located on military bases and stressed the relationship between on-base housing and 
military readiness.  The Cold War intervened and the Hook Commission’s expectations 
were never realized. Instead, the Career Compensation Act of 1949 established the Basic 
Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) system, providing housing allowances to service 
members when on-base housing was not available. BAQ became an important element of 
military compensation, and an invaluable pillar in alleviating the plight of military 
families and their housing problems. (CBO, 1993) 
4.  Post-WW-II Standing Military Expansion 
The peacetime Army of the late 1940s was at least seven times larger than its 
predecessor of the 1930s. As the wartime cooperation between the Soviet Union and the 
United States deteriorated into the Cold War, it gradually became apparent that the 
peacetime Army required after World War II would be larger than any peacetime Army 
in American History.  Among the many problems confronting the Army was the problem 
of providing family housing. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Both military and civilian housing was in short supply in the years immediately 
following World War II.  With the end of WW-II, the late 1940s saw 15 million 
American service men and women returning home.  This situation, coupled with a 
housing shortage that grew steadily between 1928 and 1948, exacerbated an already 
existing general civilian housing shortage in the United States.  In 1946, roughly 9% of 
American families lived two or three couples to a single family home. (ACHP Report, 31 
May 2002) 
The general housing shortage, and a historically large peacetime military force, 
made obtaining housing extraordinarily difficult for military families.  For the first time 
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in the history of our nation, the build-up of nuclear weapons in the years immediately 
following World War II resulted in a need to maintain a large peacetime fighting force.  
Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson summarized the acute military housing problem 
in 1949 when he said,  
Rather than be separated from their families because of lack of 
Government quarters and scarcity of adequate rental housing at their places of 
assignment, many of the service personnel have accepted disgraceful living 
conditions in shacks, trailer camps, and overcrowded buildings, many at 
extortionate rents.  It cannot be expected that competent individuals will long 
endure such conditions …there is nothing more vital or pressing in the interest of 
morale and the security of America than proper housing for our armed forces. 
(ACHP Report, 31 May 2002)   
 
C.  TRADITIONAL MFH WITH MILCON 
Congress funds the Defense Department’s budget through yearly appropriations. 
Since 1960, the Defense Department’s budget has been divided into seven appropriations 
titles: 
•  Military Personnel 
•  Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
•  Procurement 
•  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
•  Military Construction (MILCON) 
•  Family Housing (MFH) 
•  Revolving and Management Funds 
The Family Housing title is sub-divided into four major functional categories: 
•  Construction (New, Post-acquisition, Planning and Design) 
•  Operations and Maintenance (including utilities) 
•  Debt Payments 
•  DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (funds MHPI) 
Both the new construction and the post-acquisition functional categories of the 
Military Family Housing appropriation title is specifically earmarked by installation and 
by project.  There is virtually no opportunity for spending discretion below Congressional 
level. (FMR, June 2002)  Because Congress controls Military Family Housing spending 
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so tightly, the process of perceiving a housing need, justifying it, requesting and receiving 
funds, and planning/executing the project can be inordinately long.  The lag time from 
project conception and justification, through budget cycles and appropriations, and 
culminating in a military family housing unit ready for assignment and occupation ranges 
from four to ten years, with the latter being closer to the norm.  During this time, the 
project is subject to derailment by competing budgetary and political priorities within 
DoD and Congress.  As a result, DoD family housing requirements historically outpaced 
military family housing funding for unit construction, renovation and operation. (Sorce, 
2000) 
D.  PREVIOUS MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAMS 
1.  Wherry: 1949-1955 
The Wherry program required no direct Congressional funding and was intended 
to increase MFH supplies around bases that were not scheduled for downsizing or 
closure.  Private developers (sponsors) designed, built, owned, operated and maintained 
the housing on either private land or land leased from DoD at nominal rates.  Wherry 
land leases ran for a period of not less than 50 years and some leases ran for 75 years.  To 
encourage developer participation and competition, the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insured the private mortgages for up to 90% of the property’s replacement value 
or a maximum of $8,100, which limited Wherry house construction costs to $9,000 each. 
FHA also required the housing to meet its standards for design, construction, and 
livability. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Even when built on land leased from the Government, Wherry housing was not 
considered government quarters.  Although private sponsors had to give priority to 
service members who wanted to live in Wherry units, the units were considered 
commercial rental housing, open to non-military occupancy.  Soldiers and officers chose 
to rent voluntarily and paid their rent using their basic allowance for quarters to the 
private sponsor.  Rental rates, however, were not determined by the amount of the 
housing allowance.  FHA established rental schedules for the units based on its estimate 
of the income sponsors would need to operate and maintain the housing, repay the 
mortgage, and make a profit.  At a congressionally mandated maximum interest rate of 
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4%, the sponsors would pay off the mortgage in slightly less than 33 years. (Baldwin, 
1996)  
Congress and Wherry sponsors had differing views regarding time horizons for 
project profitability.  Wherry contracts and FHA rental rates were structured to provide 
sponsors with nominal profits during the first 33 years, while they repaid construction 
loans.  Meaningful profit opportunities occurred during the 17 to 42 years after 
completing loan repayments.  Congress viewed this as a fair incentive for sponsors to 
maintain the properties and to fulfill the 50 to 75 year leases. Sponsors viewed the 33- 
year nominal profit period as excessively long and unfair, making it difficult to attract 
sponsor developers and private financing. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Wherry projects encountered numerous problems and the program was cancelled 
in 1955, after building 84,000 sets of quarters.  Congress investigated reports of 
developers earning windfall profits through building code and maintenance shortcuts. 
Service components complained that the $9,000 houses were too small, poorly 
constructed and poorly maintained.  With the advent of larger Capehart housing units 
(discussed below) Wherry vacancy rates increased and sponsors complained of financial 
losses.  Wherry units included no rental or occupancy guarantees, and private citizen 
tenants were rare. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Although FHA and DoD recognized local taxation as a possible problem when the 
program was established, the rental schedules included no allowance for the expense of 
local taxation. In the spring of 1956, the Supreme Court ruled that local governments 
could tax Wherry projects.  Wherry owners immediately applied for rental increases, but 
such increases made Wherry housing less attractive to service members and increased the 
already high vacancy rates.  Preferring Government operations and maintenance, and 
intent on ending the Wherry controversy, Congress authorized the purchase of Wherry 
units in 1956.  By 1959, the service components purchased and renovated about 70% of 
the units whose average size was 831 square feet. (Baldwin, 1996) 
2.  Capehart: 1955-1964 
In 1955, Congress authorized a new MFH program, sponsored by Senator Homer 
Capehart (R-IN) intended to correct Wherry program flaws.  Under the new program, the 
FHA provided mortgage insurance for private sponsors who built, but did not operate, 
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family housing units on government-owned or leased land. The Secretary of Defense had 
to certify the need for family housing at an installation in order to initiate a project. The 
services retained architect-engineer firms to design the projects, whose designs were then 
advertised for competitive bidding. (Baldwin, 1996) 
The winning bidder formed a separate corporation for each project and obtained 
mortgage insurance for 100% of his bid from the FHA.  Insured against risk by this 
mortgage guaranty, the corporation obtained a 25-year mortgage from a private lender. 
Congress limited the mortgage rate to 4% to encourage affordable mortgages. The 
corporation also reimbursed the service component for the design costs.  Initially, FHA 
capped the mortgage insurance limit at $13,500 per unit but later raised it to $16,500. 
The increase accounted for housing industry inflation and allowed for larger, more 
desirable, quarters than Wherry permitted. (Baldwin, 1996) 
After completing Capehart construction projects, the sponsor turned the 
corporation over to the service component, which assumed the mortgage obligation.  The 
project became government quarters assigned to families of service members who 
forfeited their housing allowance.  The services used the forfeited housing allowances to 
pay off the mortgages, and operated and maintained the projects using appropriated 
funds.  Capehart added 115,000 units to the MFH inventory between 1955 and 1962. 
(Baldwin, 1996) 
Capehart housing drew Congressional criticism from its inception. Some 
complained that mortgage repayment, over a 25-year period, was substantially more 
expensive than building with appropriated funds.  Others questioned the need for 
mortgage insurance since the Government, which was essentially immune from default, 
assumed the obligations at project completion.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
even accused the services of spending excesses on “costly and desirable, but not essential 
features, such as air conditioning and dishwashers.”   By 1960, Capehart was rapidly 
falling out of favor.  Inflation increased interest rates to 4.5% and forced mortgage limits 
up to $19,800.  Disputes with contractors and ballooning costs caused the Kennedy 
administration to retire the Capehart program in 1962, with Congress voting to build 
MFH exclusively with appropriated funds.  That year, Congress authorized almost 14,000 
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new MFH units, the largest single authorization since the Korean Conflict, but 
appropriated funds for only one-half that amount. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Although Wherry and Capehart provided almost 200,000 new housing units for 
military families, popular sentiment had turned against privatization initiatives.  In 1959, 
Roland Boyd, a Texas lawyer and general council to the Wherry Housing Association 
said, if a mistake had been made in the program, it was the turning of ownership, 
operation and management of military housing over to private industry.  The military and 
private enterprise are not compatible in the field of ownership and management of 
military housing.  Both Senator Wherry and Senator Capehart conceded that building 
housing with appropriated funds would be best, but both argued that the Defense 
Department would not or could not maintain a long-term program of housing 
construction because of the many demands on its resources.  The decade of the 1960s 
would prove them right.  The first post-Capehart appropriated housing program was 
drastically reduced before it left Congress, and in a few years the war in Southeast Asia 
pushed housing to a low priority. (Baldwin, 1996) 
3.  Vietnam Years 
In the early 1960s, privatization programs fell out of favor with Congress, and the 
Defense Department returned to building MFH with appropriated (MILCON) funds. 
Although Congress pledged to continue the rapid pace of housing construction, the war in 
Southeast Asia soon relegated housing to a low priority.  However, the Defense 
Department acknowledged that it would have to rely on the private community to provide 
most of its family housing. In areas where housing was not available, not adequate or not 
affordable, or where military necessity required it, the Defense Department would still 
provide military housing.  In 1973, the nation adopted the all-volunteer force (AVF). To 
make military service more attractive to volunteers, Congress supported a brief surge of 
family housing construction with appropriated funds in the mid-1970s.  But the budget 
priorities of the Carter administration in the late 1970s again reduced the level of family 
housing construction. (Baldwin, 1993) 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought to office an administration 
determined to rebuild American military strength and committed to using private 
enterprise to perform as many governmental functions as possible.  But the cost of 
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erasing the Defense Department's housing deficit with appropriated funds was staggering 
and competed with the numerous other requirements for rebuilding the armed forces.  
Again, as they had done three decades earlier, Congress and the administration turned to 
the private sector for the capital to revitalize family housing. (Baldwin, 1993)  Congress 
first authorized leasing at all military installations in 1962.  But domestic short-term 
leasing remained a relatively small program.  Leasing overseas expanded dramatically, 
however, in the mid-1970s as the Defense Department turned to this approach to provide 
much-needed family housing abroad.  When the administration and Congress tackled the 
problem of military family housing in the early 1980s, they had a variety of options to 
consider from the rich, but often misunderstood, history of Defense Department housing 
privatization programs. (Baldwin, 1993) 
By 1980, family housing became a high priority for the Defense Department due 
to demographic changes among the troops.  While the proportion of married officers was 
always high, the proportion of married enlisted personnel had grown steadily since the 
end of World War II and especially after the formation of the AVF.  DoD leadership 
increasingly recognized the influence of family issues on morale and reenlistment and in 
1983 declared that support for military families was described as “an organizational 
imperative.” (Baldwin, 1993) 
4.  Section 801 and 802 Leasing Programs of the 1980s 
In the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (Public Law 
98-115), Congress enacted, and President Ronald Reagan signed into law, legislation that 
established two new pilot programs for military family housing. Dubbed the “801” and 
“802” programs after the sections of the act that established them, the programs 
attempted to tap the resources of the private sector to improve military family housing.  
Armed with a series of inducements and guarantees, the Defense Department hoped to 
persuade private developers to build family housing on or near military installations and 
make that housing available to service members.  Better family housing, the Defense 
Department argued, would improve morale and encourage reenlistment.  While these 
factors are critical to any armed force, they were especially important for a rapidly 
expanding, all-volunteer force, which was just a decade old.  As the Reagan 
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administration launched its post-Vietnam buildup of American forces, family housing, 
like manpower and hardware, would benefit from increased military spending. (Baldwin, 
1996) 
The Section 801 and 802 programs were touted as the complete solution to DoD’s 
long-standing housing problem.  During congressional testimony in 1983, Lawrence 
Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics said 
the new 801/802 programs would  
maximize private initiative, benefit the community, minimize government 
involvement, increase freedom of choice for all people in choosing housing, and 
greatly reduce the Government’s short and long-term costs. 
   
Section 801/802 MFH was rented primarily to military service members.  
Although service members were not officially required to accept 801/802 units, they were 
strongly advertised and supported by the installation housing offices.  For service 
members, 801/802 units were easy to obtain and less costly than other private sector 
housing when traditional on-post housing was not available.  Eligible military personnel 
voluntarily rented the units, using their housing allowances, and paid their own utilities 
out of pocket.  Rental rates were determined jointly between DoD and the developers, 
and were described as “reasonably equivalent to comparable rental units in the 
community.”  The private developer operated, maintained and managed the housing 
units.  The developer risked losing his lease/rental guarantee if maintenance and 
management support was inadequate.  The Defense Department had the right of first 
refusal to acquire the units at the end of the leases. (Baldwin, 1996) 
Both 801 and 802 were initially designated as two-year pilot programs.  Congress 
renewed them annually before modifying them and making them permanent housing 
options in 1991.  Reluctant to relinquish any budget control to DoD, 801/802 deals 
required Congressional approval after the service components negotiated/structured the 
deals with private developers.  The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 required specific language in the contract agreements stating that “the obligation 
of the United States to make payments under the agreement in any fiscal year is subject to 
the availability of appropriations for that purpose,” and is commonly referred to as the 
‘subject-to-availability-of-funds’ clause.  This provision made private developers 
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skeptical of the Government’s long-term intentions, significantly hampering efforts to 
encourage private investment in 801/802 projects, and leading to a slow start for the 
programs. 
a.  Section 801, Before 1991: “Build-to-Lease” 
Section 801 was significantly more successful than its 802 cousin.  It was 
called ‘build-to-lease’ because developers built the housing units after winning 
competitive bid processes, entered into lease agreements with service components and 
obtained Congressional approval.  The projects required new unit construction, built either 
on-post or off-post, in accordance with local building codes, rather than DoD construction 
standards.  Off-post units were to be located within 30 miles and a 60-minute commute 
from the installation, and were subject to local property taxes.  The leases were 20 years in 
length, allowing either contractor or Government operations and maintenance.  
The service component paid rent, in the form of lease payments, in return 
for filling all units with military personnel.  The rent was funded from a pool of money 
derived from forfeited housing allowances.  Service members forfeited receipt of their 
housing allowance and paid their own utilities out-of-pocket.  Rental prices were based 
on the Government’s leasing contract with the developer and not connected to housing 
allowance rates. 
b.  Section 801, Problems and Revisions 
Section 801 projects immediately encountered a host of difficulties but 
managed to produce housing units throughout the 1980s. Projects were significantly 
delayed as developers negotiated lower, more favorable tax rates with local governments, 
and tried to avoid Davis-Bacon wage rates.  The Department of Labor eventually ruled in 
favor of the labor unions, upholding Davis-Bacon wages, thereby prompting developers 
to ask for additional funding since the higher Davis-Bacon wage rates were not priced 
into bids.  The services argued that the lower property taxes and the associated delays 
while contractors negotiated them were adequate offsetting values for the higher wages.   
Another source of controversy regarded the Government’s responsibility to ensure the 
projects’ adherence to construction codes.  DoD claimed it had only to ‘monitor’ the  
projects, since they were built to commercial standards, not DoD codes; and that local 
governments and investors shouldered the duty to ‘inspect.’  The General Accounting 
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Office (GAO) agreed that DoD need only monitor the projects, but must more 
specifically define exactly what monitoring entailed. (GAO/NSIAD -87-13BR) 
To obtain lower land costs, and consequently lower bid prices, some 
contractors sought land at the outer reaches of the 30 mile/60-minute range arc.  At Fort 
Drum, New York, 801 residents complained of isolation from the Post and its associated 
facilities benefits, coupled with frequent and excessive commuting hazards, especially 
during winter weather.  By 1986, section 801 still appeared favorably enough to DoD that 
the Department’s policy was to obtain all future MFH through a 60/40 mix of MILCON 
and 801 programs.  Congress was skeptical as to how 801 leasing could be less costly, in 
the long run, when compared to MILCON “ownership.”  They required that all 801 
projects show at least a 5% cost savings when compared to MILCON before approving 
the lease arrangements.  GAO was also skeptical, firmly believing that leasing was more 
expensive in the long run due to contractor profits, poor construction quality, and poor 
maintenance prospects.  While not mandatory, GAO recommended the services include 
performance bonds in their contracts, to increase the probability of successful project 
completion with minimal financially related delays (GAO/NSIAD -87-13BR).  The 
services, primarily the Army, had not used performance bonds, believing that a 
guaranteed long-term lease arrangement negated their usefulness, and only increased 
overall project cost.  Congress modified the 801 programs in 1991, ending its pilot stage 
and making it a permanent MFH option.  The changes included allowing for rehabilitated 
units to increase program flexibility and reduce costs, especially in urban areas. 
Addressing GAO concerns, off -post construction was mandated.  GAO 
argued that on-post projects were not operating leases, but were actually disguised capital 
leases, with significant legal and funding implications since the Government was 
effectively obligated to purchase the property at the end of the lease (GAO/NSIAD -87-
13BR). Finally, DoD agreed to assume operations and maintenance functions, easing 
congressional fears of developers skimming maintenance dollars to boost profits and 
leaving service members to reside in substandard/unsafe conditions.  GAO contended 
that, similar to Wherry projects, developers would lose interest in maintenance after the 
first seven or eight years of the lease, when maintenance costs increased and profit-
boosting depreciation was exhausted. 
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c. Section 802, Before 1987: “Rental Guarantee” 
This program was called ‘rental guarantee’ because the service component 
guaranteed that military personnel would occupy a minimum percentage (up to 97%) of 
the units, with the service filling the rental gap if occupancy was too low.  To minimize 
the chances of a vacancy gap, 802 projects were restricted to bases where current 
military-controlled housing had exceeded a 97% occupancy rate for the preceding 18 
consecutive months.  This requirement could be waived for new installations or those 
expecting a large increase in military personnel during the 1980s expansion.  Section 802 
projects required new unit construction, built either on-post or off-post, in accordance 
with DoD construction standards, and subject to local property taxes.  The rental 
guarantees lasted for a 15-year maximum, were not renewable, and specified contractor 
operations and maintenance.  DoD was responsible for 80% of the property tax increases 
over the contract life. 
Service members received their housing allowance, and forwarded it to the 
contractor as rental payment, paying for their own utilities out-of-pocket.  To protect 
against escalating rental rates, only that portion of the rent devoted to operation and 
maintenance (maintenance rent) was allowed to rise over the contract period.  Shelter rent 
was fixed over the contract life. 
d.  Section 802, Problems and Revisions 
From the beginning, section 802 projects were unpopular with private 
developers.  Since shelter rent was fixed over the contract life, and initial construction 
costs were capped at about 85% of the average occupants housing allowance, contractors 
envisioned inadequate profitability opportunities.  By 1987, section 802 had produced no 
housing, and was “dying on the vine.”  Congress revived the program by relaxing its 
parameters.  Using local building codes and including rehabilitated units reduced 
construction costs and attracted private investor interest.  Unfreezing shelter rent, 
permitting government O&M, and extending contract life spans to 25 years increased 
developers’ long-term profitability prospects.  Lastly, for those projects built on 
Government land, lease renewal became an option, but was limited to the length of the 
original contract.  By 1993, section 802 had produced only 276 units, and although 
authorized, its use was not pursued. 
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E.  ELIGIBILITY 
Eligibility refers to who is deemed qualified and deserving to live in MFH.   
Before 1949, marriage among the enlisted ranks was discouraged and reinforced by 
housing policy.  Enlisted soldiers were assigned to barracks and paid for separate quarters 
out of their own pockets if they wished to bring their spouses/children with them to their 
duty stations. (Alt, 1991)  Including junior enlisted personnel with families in the housing 
allowance system, like their inclusion in the system of DoD family housing, is relatively 
recent.  The Career Compensation Act of 1949 marked the first time that most grades of 
enlisted personnel became eligible for cash housing allowances similar to those that 
officers received, but only at “without dependants” rates.  Marriage among junior enlisted 
personnel was strongly discouraged.  The 1949 act also made married “career” enlisted 
personnel (defined as corporals with seven years of service and all sergeants) eligible for 
public quarters, believing housing allowance “with dependants” was unnecessary since 
government housing program expansions would soon fill the need.  Enlisted personnel 
struggled to meet housing needs throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Although some 
additional allowances were available for special dependency cases, advent of the all-
volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 finally established housing allowance “with-dependant” 
rates for junior enlisted personnel. (CBO, 1993) 
After 1973, all junior enlisted personnel with dependants became eligible for 
housing allowance, but not all were eligible for on-base government quarters.  MFH was 
still restricted and described by Congress in 1983 as available to those personnel who “in 
all likelihood are committed to a career in the military.”  Specifically, the minimum rank 
was set at “E4 with over 2 years of service, except when all eligible personnel are 
otherwise adequately housed.” (Baldwin, 1996)  Because of congressional involvement in 
the section 801/802 programs, DoD gradually made all married enlisted personnel 
eligible for MFH.  Today, MFH for married junior enlisted personnel is considered a 
valuable tool to encourage favorable first term retention decisions, to promote military 





F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While the Federal Government’s housing policies regarding military families 
changed significantly over the last 200 years, one condition has pervaded the landscape.  
The supply of housing units available to military families has consistently lagged the 
demand for these units.  Moreover, the questionable quality and low affordability of these 
structures led to additional hardships and sacrifices by service members and their 
families.  Although Congress and the Defense Department have applied significant effort 
to eliminate the problem over the last 50 years, military family housing shortages and 























Figure 2 - 1:  Artist’s Rendering of Craftsman Junior NCO’s Quarters 
 
Source:  From Monterey RCI website 
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III.  SERVICE COMPARISON 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the Military Housing Privatization Initiative and its 
alternative authorizations.  It will discuss the Army, Navy and Air Force’s approach to 
privatization and how each service utilizes the twelve alternative authorizations to 
improve the housing of its members.  Finally, it will discuss the process used by each 
service in selecting a contractor and the contractual relationship between the service and 
the contractor.    
B.   MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
In 1996, Congress and DoD tried something very different from traditional 
housing methods.  Congress authorized DoD under the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative, contained in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act (Appendix B), to privatize 
military housing.   The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) was devised to 
give the DoD a set of tools to entice private investment by encouraging DoD to act more 
like a private enterprise.  Just as business can consider local real estate market conditions 
in customizing development projects, the MHPI was designed to give similar flexibility 
to DoD.  This initiative was intended as a step away from the perceived one-size-fits-all 
mentality of earlier programs.  (Else, 2001) 
MHPI was created in Section 2801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
1996 (PL104-106) as a five-year pilot program within a 10-year plan to resolve the 
general military housing problem.  Through the use of its alternative authorizations, 
Congress intended to improve military housing quickly and economically by using 
relatively small federal contributions to leverage private investment.  These alternative 
authorizations include: 
• Conveyance of real property:  The Government may transfer title of Federal 
property to private ownership. 
• Relaxation of Federal specifications for housing construction:  Builders are 
allowed to construct housing in accordance with local building codes. 
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• Inclusion of ancillary support facilities:  Bids for contracts may incorporate 
additional amenities, such as child care centers and dining facilities, to 
enhance the attractiveness of the basic housing. 
• Payment of rent by allotment:  Landlords may receive payment of rents 
through automatic electronic fund transfer from the appropriate Federal 
disbursing facility, guaranteeing cash flow. 
• Loan guarantee:  The Government may guarantee up to 80% of the private 
sector loans arranged by the property developer. 
• Direct Loan:  The Government may make a loan directly to the contractor. 
• Differential Lease Payment:  The Government may agree to pay a differential 
between the BAH paid to Service members and local market rents. 
• Investment (Joint Venture):  The Government may take an equity stake in a 
housing construction enterprise. 
• Interim Leases:  The Government may lease private housing units while 
awaiting the completion of a project. 
• Assignment of Service members:  Service personnel may be assigned to 
housing in a particular project that they may otherwise not choose to occupy. 
• Build to lease:  The Government may contract for the private construction of a 
housing project, and then lease its units. 
• Rental guarantee:  The Government may guarantee a minimal occupancy rate 
or rental income for a housing project. 
Originally, control of housing projects was centralized in OSD’s Office of 
Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  But under OSD’s direct control, projects were 
slow to develop.  To encourage the services and to remove the perceived bureaucratic 
block, in October, 1998, the Secretary of Defense devolved operational responsibility for 
MHPI to the individual Services, retaining oversight and final approval authority in 
OSD’s Office of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization.  Central features of the MHPI 
are its flexibility and its decentralized execution.  However, projects tend to follow 
similar progressions. 
First, the appropriate service establishes the need for new or renovated housing at 
an installation through a site review and feasibility study.  This examination includes an 
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evaluation of the local private housing market and a cost-benefit comparison between the 
use of an MHPI package and traditional construction methods.  The Service briefs the 
results of the site review and feasibility study to OSD’s Office of Competitive Sourcing 
and Privatization.  If the concept is approved, the Service is authorized to develop an 
appropriate solicitation proposal.  Congress is notified before the completed solicitation is 
issued to private industry.  Congress is again notified when the successful solicitation 
response is selected and before a contract is awarded. 
All of the privatization deals involve turning over housing allowances to 
developers over several decades in exchange for building, maintaining and managing 
housing on military bases.  Developers borrow millions of dollars from banks and other 
financial institutions to begin new construction and renovation projects.  They make their 
money back—in addition to a profit over the course of a typical 50-year deal—by 
receiving a steady income from housing allowances.  (Cahlink, 2001) 
DoD set only two ground rules for the services in setting their own privatization 
methods.  Developers must pledge at least three times as much money as the military 
invests to get projects off the ground and they must eliminate inadequate housing by 
2010.  (Cahlink, 2001)  John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Industrial Affairs and Installations, issued a policy memo on 09 October 1998 containing 
MHPI project leverage requirements.  The leverage ratio is a measure of the funds 
required to complete a housing project under MHPI compared to the amount of funds 
required to complete a project under traditional MILCON of identical scope and size.  As 
stated in the memo, a privatization project must obtain a minimum three to one leverage 
ratio.    
C.   ARMY 
After several studies, the Army chose Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) as 
its program.  The goal of RCI is to eliminate inadequate Army housing in the United 
States by 2007.  The three main objectives are (1) to create world class, quality 
residential communities, (2) to leverage assets/scarce funds, and (3) to obtain private  
sector expertise, creativity, innovation and capital.  Under the RCI, the Army will 
establish long-term business relationships (usually 50 years) with private sector 
developers for the purpose of improving military family housing communities.  The 
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Army will provide the developer a long-term interest in both land and family housing 
assets.  These developers will become the master community developers for the Army 
community.  The primary source of financial return for the developers will be the revenue 
stream generated from the military personnel’s basic allowance for housing (BAH) which 
will be paid as rent.  (Army RCI webpage) 
The Army-developer relationship is not essentially a contractual one.  When the 
Army RCI PM speaks of “long-term business relationships,” he is describing limited 
liability corporations or, in the case of Fort Hood, a limited liability partnership.  For 
example, in Monterey the RCI Program leveraged the Army and Navy’s equity in land 
and housing to “buy” 49% of Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC, a limited liability 
corporation, chartered in California.   That corporation then contracted with Clark 
Pinnacle Military Housing, LLC,  to construct and manage new housing communities on 
the Presidio of Monterey, the Naval Postgraduate School, La Mesa Family Housing, and 
the Ord Military Community.   
The only contracts involved in this corporate relationship are (1) the $350,000 
contract between the Army and Clark Pinnacle to produce a Community Development 
Management Plan and (2) any commercial contracts the Corporation lets for specific 
supplies and services.   
1. Scope of RCI 
The Army’s privatization program began with four projects:  Fort Carson, Fort 
Hood, Fort Lewis, and Fort Meade.  The current plan for the Army includes 26 RCI 
projects that include over 72,922 homes in the United States.  That equates to more than 
80 percent of all Army family housing.  As of August 2003, the Army has selected 
partners for eleven additional projects with the transfers of assets/operations expected to 
take place in late fiscal year 2003 or 2004. 
The following map shows the Army’s RCI sites as of October 2003.  The 








Figure 3 - 1:  RCI Sitemap 
  
Source:  From Army RCI Webpage 
 
2.  Acquisition Process 
RCI focuses on residential communities (not just houses) and uses a two-step 
Request for Qualifications (RFQ) acquisition process that attracts quality developers who 
bring best practices/innovations to the Army’s RCI program.  See Figure 3-2 for a picture 
of RCI’s selection process.  At no point in this process is cost a factor.  At the same time, 
the RFQ process reduces the time/costs for both the Army and the developers who 
participate in RCI.  The process also seeks to evaluate/award on the basis that the firm 
selected is the most highly qualified to engage in discussions with the Army to create a 
mutually agreed upon business plan to meet the Army’s requirements.  (RCI Webpage)   
The RFQ procurement approach allows the Army to: 
• Provide greater flexibility in negotiating long-term agreements. 
• Maximize opportunities for interchange between developers, locals, and the 
Army. 
• Take advantage of partner innovation, creativity, and expertise. 
• Provide opportunities to craft the best business and development plans. 
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• Provide a mechanism for consultation with OSD/Congress during the process. 
• Promote competition by lowering entry costs for bidders to submit responses. 
• Maximize competition because the private sector accepts this process. 
• Create complex real estate plans with expertise/advice or expert consultants. 
 
Figure 3 - 2:  The RCI Selection Process in Monterey 
 
                                                             Source:  Authors 
31 
The Army publishes three Minimum Experience Requirements for an initial 
screen of qualified bidders, and then the Army announces the sites with a two-step RFQ.  
The three pre-qualifying factors include: 1) development, 2) property management, and 
3) capital formation.  The first step of the two-step RFQ process determines the 
competitive range for a group of sites using the following five evaluation factors.  (RCI 
Webpage) 
• Experience 
• Financial Capabilities 
• Organizational Capability 
• Past Performance 
• Small Business Plan 
 Government contracting personnel would recognize the first step in the Army’s 
process as a formal source selection which does not consider cost and whose ultimate 
goal is define a competitive range of contractors qualified to become the Army’s 
corporate partners in military housing construction and maintenance. 
 In fact, for all the Army’s projects, the Army RCI PM prepares the first-step RFQ 
for a series of geographically related projects.  The Monterey project, including both the 
Presidio of Monterey and the Naval Postgraduate School, was grouped with Fort Irwin, 
Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, and Moffett Federal Airfield.  The Baltimore 
District of the Army Corps of Engineers issued the actual RFQ.  Contractors interested in 
working with the Army on any or all of the projects submitted their qualifications.  After 
contractor responses were received, a five-member Evaluation Board, including local 
RCI PMs and the Army RCI PM reviewed and ranked them.  Twenty-two contractors 
submitted qualifications for the California group of projects.  The board left only three 
contractors in its competitive range.     
Step two of the process then allowed those in the competitive range to bid on any 
of the sites listed in step one as they are solicited.  Step two used the following four 
factors and these factors are evaluated based on submissions and oral presentations. 
• Preliminary Project Concept Statement 
• Financial Return 
• Organizational Capability (Installation Specific) 
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• Small Business Utilization Plan (Installation Specific) 
Contractor proposals in response to the second step solicitation were evaluated 
locally.  In Monterey’s case, all three contractors in the competitive range made oral 
presentations.  Those presentations were evaluated and Clark Pinnacle Military Housing, 
LLC, was selected to receive a contract to work with the Army to prepare a Community 
Development Management Plan.  
  3.  Community Development Management Plan (CDMP) 
Upon award, the Army and Clark Pinnacle worked together to craft a CDMP that 
set forth the terms of the developer’s long-term relationship with the Army.  The CDMP 
has three components: 1) Development, 2) Financial/Transactional, and 3) Operations 
and Property Management.  The development plan consists of the master plan, the plan 
for renovation or construction, subcontracting and small business plan, and the schedule.  
The financial plan consists of the life-cycle cash flow, the sources and uses of finances, 
and the transitional instruments that will be utilized.  The property management portion 
of the plan consists of operations, maintenance standards, the organizational 
chart/staffing, and the transition plan.  (RCI webpage)   
The Army lists the benefits of the CDMP process as: 
• Allows the Army/developer to work through issues collaboratively, and 
ensures major issues are identified and addressed before execution of the plan. 
• Provides a forum for the Army to consider proposals from the developer 
concerning the use of specific privatization authorities. 
• Provides a mechanism for conferring with Congress, local communities, and 
other organizations to ensure the needs of all interested parties are considered. 
The CDMP process takes about seven months to complete.  During the first six 
months, the partner and the Army craft the CDMP.  The Army then staffs the CDMP and 
submits it to Congress.  If Congress does not object to the project, the Army issues a 
notice of Transition and the developer is paid $350,000 for the CDMP.  In return for this 
payment, the Army is granted full and unlimited rights to use the CDMP.  Three months 
later, assets/operations are turned over to the partner, which is typically a limited 
partnership or limited liability company that includes the Army and the developer as 
partners.  (RCI webpage)  
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Curiously, despite the fact that the Army pays developers for the CDMPs, the 
housing corporations treat them as entirely proprietary.  Contracting personnel recognize 
contractors’ tendency to stamp every page of their submissions “Proprietary.”  Stamping 
every page avoids real evaluations of which pages actually contain sensitive information, 
and they tend to limit the number of people who see the plans.  Probably the Plans do 
contain some sensitive financial information, but limited amounts of sensitive 
information do not justify refusing to allow public scrutiny of Government documents.   
For example, the Army RCI PM showed us a one-page schedule of planned 
construction and renovation at Fort Belvoir over the fifty-year life of the project.  That 
schedule contained no financial information, but the PM refused to allow us to have a 
copy, claiming that the plan was proprietary.  (Spigelmyer, 2003)  Given the relative ease 
with which a CDMP could be “sanitized,” it seems unlikely that Army RCI could 
withstand a Freedom of Information Act request for the documentation.    
4.  Portfolio and Asset Management (PAM)  
Although RCI project award and transfer of assets/operations are more visible 
RCI activities, PAM functions are the most important because they are necessary to 
ensure that the Army’s investment, assets, and portfolio are fully protected against any 
current and potential crisis and/or shortfalls over the next 50 years of the 28 RCI projects. 
In the private sector, the primary benchmark for measuring success of a portfolio 
is financial return.  While this measure is not the fundamental criterion for RCI PAM, the 
same underlying principles, strategies, tools, and approaches apply.  To ensure this, RCI 
project performance is measured on: 
• Soldier/Family Satisfaction 
• Enhancement/Preservation of Housing 
• Mitigation of Risk to the Project 
• Successful Completion of the Development 
To measure this performance, PAM is established at two levels.  The first, 
Portfolio Management, includes the information required by Headquarters with the 
objective of assessing and assuring the overall success of RCI.  Information collected and 
analyzed at Headquarters will also be provided back to the installation to enhance the 
success of individual projects.  The second level, Asset Management, will focus on 
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information prepared/used by installations to assess the success of its project. (RCI 
Homepage) 
The Army’s approach to PAM also envisions tailoring its program to meet the 
specific need of each Army housing privatization project and to provide key lessons 
learned to enhance and improve the policies/procedures at existing projects as well as 
drive a “best practice” approach for future projects. 
D.   NAVY/MARINE CORPS 
The Navy pioneered the MHPI effort in 1994 when it obtained authority from 
Congress to create Public-Private Ventures (PPV) as a way to correct its housing 
problems.  Under this venture, a private company (typically a limited liability company) 
builds, maintains, and manages family housing communities in a partnership with the 
service.  The Navy and Marine Corps view privatization not only as a way to improve 
housing, but also as an investment opportunity.  The PPV arrangements require the 
services to take on a greater financial burden, but also enable them to share in the 
revenues generated by housing privatization.  (Cahlink, 2001) 
The limited liability companies can be used for developing housing on Navy 
bases and Government land, as well as on private land.  The partnerships include many of 
the features pursued by other services, such as using housing allowances to pay for on-
base housing.  But the agreements also make use of other Congressional authorities, such 
as allowing the services to invest in non-government entities and convey excess land to 
private developers.  These deals do not allow the land to be sold and are often 50-year 
arrangements that end with housing transferred back to the Navy and Marine Corps.  
(Cahlink, 2001) 
There are several key features to the PPV according to the Navy-Marine Corps.  
These features include: 
• Zero out-of-pocket expenses to the service member 
• Military construction quality or better for the homes 
• The elimination of the renovation/replacement backlog 
• Guaranteed operation and maintenance resources for the long term 
• Future renovations/replacements will be fully funded by this project 
• Services reserve accounts are established to fund future unknowns 
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• The services participate in all key management decisions 
By 2005, the Navy plans to complete sixteen PPV deals at eleven bases, with 
some bases having two or three different PPV deals to account for all of the privatized 
housing.  The Navy plans to convey 8,669 adequate units to PPV by 2010.  PPV 
renovates 5,144 inadequate units while MILCON renovates 13,657 units.  New PPV 
construction will replace 3,739 demolished units while MILCON will replace 1,830 
demolished units.  PPV and MILCON will demolish and not replace 3,373 inadequate 
units at bases with excess capacity.  By 2010, PPV will reduce the overall family housing 
deficit at underserved bases by 3,844 units through new construction, while MILCON 
reduces the family housing deficit by only 517 units.  (Navy-FHMP, 2001) 
While some Navy deals are for 30 to 50 years, with the housing reverting to Navy 
control at termination, some are also much shorter, with provisions to sell the property on 
the open real estate market.  The shorter deals, which take place at smaller bases and 
encompass fewer units, are for ten to fifteen years and allow for the sale of individual 
units as early as the sixth year of operations.  Current residents have purchase priority and 
may be offered reduced closing costs and relief from real estate commissions.  When the 
deal reaches full term, the PPV liquidates the remaining units on the open market.  
Because it is a full business partner in the PPV, with a significant financial stake, the 
Navy receives a substantial portion of the liquidation proceeds.  This process may be 
reinvested in another local PPV if a housing shortage still persists, or they may be 
invested in a PPV at a different Navy base with MFH shortages. 
E.   AIR FORCE 
The Air Force plans to privatize a total of 32,900 units under 34 different projects.  
This represents 30% of its total housing inventory. With a total of 65,254 inadequate 
houses within the Air Force, it is believed that it would take at least 20 years at current 
funding levels for the housing to be revitalized using traditional MILCON methods.   
The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) administers the 
MHPI for the Secretary of the Air Force through their Housing Privatization Office 
(HPO).  The AFCEE-HPO describes its plan as a program that matches Air Force 
requirements to real estate market opportunities to provide the best value housing, 
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maximizing developer creativity and returning a transaction with a high potential for 
successful completion.   
Under AFCEE-HPO’s plan, private developers own the housing units, located on 
private land or on land leased from the Air Force.  Air Force personnel receive BAH and 
pay rent to the private developer.  Rents are less than the BAH rates with the difference 
accounting for a utility allowance.  This is designed to eliminate out-of-pocket expenses 
for the average tenant.  The developer manages and maintains the property for fifty years.  
Tenants pay for utilities directly without government or developer involvement.  (AF-
FHMP, 1999) 
Although the Air Force believes MHPI is a key element to eliminating inadequate 
family housing, it intends to use traditional MILCON methods to accomplish most of its 
housing revitalization.  Major General Earnest Robbins, who oversees the Air Force’s 
MHPI program, admits that his service’s more tentative approach to MHPI precludes it 
from meeting the DoD guidance to eliminate inadequate housing by 2010.  He says the 
Air Force prefers a “balanced approach,” preferring privatization only at bases located in 
strong commercial housing markets, and intending to reinvest savings from MHPI 
projects into other MILCON projects.  Robust commercial markets ensure the Air Force 
and developer could easily obtain civilian tenants or sell the housing units if the Air 
Force no longer needs them.  (Cahlink, 2001) 
The Air Force uses three criteria to determine the appropriate investment strategy 
for revitalizing housing at each base.  If all criteria are met, privatization is generally 
accepted.  If any one of the three criteria is not met, the traditional MILCON option is 
generally accepted. 
• Severability.  The Air Force requires privatized housing to be physically 
separate from other installation functions.  To be eligible for privatization, it 
must be possible, but not required, to place a fence around the housing area 
and to obtain access to the area from a public road.  This ensures that if, at a 
later date, the demand for military families is insufficient to fill housing, 
alternate civilian renters could access the housing estate without entering the 
operational portion of the installation.  (AF-FHMP, 1999) 
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• Economic Feasibility—Scored Cost.  The privatization candidate must obtain 
the minimum three to one leverage ratio required by DoD policy.  The scored 
cost, under the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, cannot 
exceed one-third of the estimated MILCON cost to complete a project of 
identical scope.  (AF-FHMP, 1999). 
• Economic Feasibility—Life Cycle Costs (LCC).  The LCC associated with 
privatization must be less than the LCC for an identical MILCON project.  
The Air Force defines the MHPI LCC as the sum of the OMB scored costs 
and the net present value of the expected BAH paid to service members living 
in the privatized units.  Government ownership LCC is the sum of the 
MILCON construction costs and the NPV of all estimated future costs for 
maintenance, repair, utility, management, and any other services provided 
over the life of the units.  (AF-FHMP, 1999)   
Only time will tell whether the Air Force’s more limited approach to privatization 
is more successful than the Army’s.  The Army takes limited MILCON appropriations 
very seriously.  Many of its projects assume no cash contribution from the Government.  
In Monterey, for example, Government land and housing represent the Army’s entire 
equity in Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC.  In contrast, if a project does not meet 
the Air Force’s three criteria for privatization, it opts to wait for MILCON funding for the 
project.   
The Air Force may capitalize on the Army’s success.  If the Army modernizes its 
housing while minimizing use of MILCON appropriations, those appropriations may be 
available to the Air Force.   
As we shall see in Chapter V, several environmental factors affect the economic 
feasibility of each project.  Perhaps the most important factor is the health of the 
commercial housing market.  In Monterey, for example, taking one’s BAH and renting a 
house or apartment from a commercial landlord is a viable alternative, especially if BAH 
keeps pace with commercial rents.  Conversely, since all the housing is accessible, 
renting to the public at prevailing commercial rates is also a viable alternative.   Thus, if 
the Corporation were to produce substandard housing or if maintenance were sub par, 
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potential renters may choose not to live in it.  The pressures of the commercial 
marketplace force the Corporation to build and maintain attractive communities.   
However, the markets are very different in Fort Polk or Fort Irwin, where there 
are no viable alternatives to military family housing.  The Air Force would probably 
choose not to privatize such sites.  One of the Army’s strategies for attracting corporate 
partners to such projects is to group them with other more attractive sites.  For example, 
the Army grouped Fort Irwin with Park Reserve Forces Training Area and Moffett Field; 
and Picatinny Arsenal was grouped with Fort Monmouth and Carlisle Barracks.  
Privatization is more risky in these less commercially-viable locations.     
F.     CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although DoD maintains oversight and sets policy, the distinct approaches taken 
by the Air Force, Army and Navy/Marine Corps demonstrate the inherent flexibility built 
into the MHPI program and the services’ long-standing tradition to differentiate 
themselves from one another.  Each of the services recognized the MHPI as a unique 
opportunity to improve their long-standing housing problems and have taken aggressive 
steps to institute the program.  Moreover, recent military studies indicate that high-quality 
housing can boost retention by up to 15%.  The services realize that they enlist soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and marines; but they retain families. 
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IV.  RCI AT MONTEREY 
A.    INTRODUCTION 
Utilizing a strategy developed by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management and refined at Forts Hood, Lewis, and Meade, the Program 
Manager (PM) for RCI issued a Request for Qualification to all contractors interested in 
forming a limited liability corporation to build and manage more than one thousand 
family housing units on Navy land (La Mesa Village) and on Army land (Ord Military 
Community).   
Applying Source Selection Procedures from contracting, a Source Selection 
Board reviewed the submissions and selected Clark Pinnacle as the most likely candidate.  
Clark Pinnacle then had approximately a month to submit a proposal for demolishing all 
the housing units and building entire new communities.   Predictably, the proposal was 
not particularly good.  Monterey’s PM RCI and Clark Pinnacle then consolidated their 
efforts to develop a Community Development Management Plan (CDMP), a detailed plan 
for forming a limited liability corporation and for constructing and maintaining all the 
family housing on the Monterey Peninsula.  The CDMP serves as the blueprint for RCI 
Monterey and as the basic submission to Congress.  Congress approved Monterey’s 
CDMP in 2003.   
The basic problem with all military housing programs from 1949 to the present 
has been funding shortages.  In the case of RCI Monterey, the corporation secured $450 
million in private financing by pledging military BAH and commercial rent.  
Privatization led to some curious work-arounds.   Requiring service members to live in 
the corporation’s houses is an indicator of government housing.  The Office of 
Management and Budget cautions that such indicators of government housing jeopardize 
the private financing.  So, the corporation cannot require service members to live in its 
housing.   
Currently, approximately 68% of married service members on the Peninsula live 
in military housing—the highest percentage in the country.  As a result of increased BAH 
and the requirement that all occupants of corporation housing assign their entire BAH to 
the corporation as rent, larger percentages of military personnel are expected to elect not 
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to live in corporation housing.  That in turn leads to higher vacancy rates, jeopardizing 
the profitability of the corporation.  In expectation of vacancies and to further bolster the 
private face of the project, civilians are expected to occupy some percentage of corporate 
housing.  Service members will have the right of first refusal, and, if necessary, non-
military renters will be moved out to accommodate service members.  
  Overall, 2,209 houses will be built on the Monterey Peninsula.  Clark-Pinnacle 
began receiving BAH in October 2003—the same month it began to demolish older 
homes and assumed responsibility for government housing on the Peninsula. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS    
The Department of the Army (DA) sees external stakeholders as key to 
successfully implementing its Residential Communities Initiative and has forged strategic 
alliances with key stakeholders.  The DA’s initial plan, completed in September 1998,  
    





called for the privatization of 85,000 Army Family Housing (AFH) units over ten years at 
43 U.S. locations.  Privatization would leverage private sector resources and “cost avoid” 
all or most of an estimated $6 billion requirement.    
The stakeholders depicted in Figure 4-1 can be considered change strategists, 
change implementers, and change recipients.  The change strategists for Monterey consist 
of Congress, Department of the Army RCI office, and, to an extent, the local program 
director.  The change implementers consist of the program office in Monterey and Clark-
Pinnacle.  The change recipients are the service members and their families.  Each of 
them can become a roadblock to change if they are not convinced that this change in 
housing is a smart one.  For the change recipients, their behavior will determine whether 
this change will be a success or not.  The Army will not force the military families to live 
within this community so the families hold a great deal of power as the recipients of this 
change.   
In September of 2002, Monterey Bay Military Housing, Limited Liability 
Corporation (MBMH LLC) held a meeting for any and all internal and external 
stakeholders of this housing project.  The MBMH LLC targeted its stakeholders in the 
following ways (Collier, 2003): 
1.   Department of the Army RCI  
The Department of the Army RCI (DA RCI) is the lead office for the Army’s RCI 
project and a definite supporter.  Because of their position, they have a vested interest in 
all of the 28 RCI projects within the Army.  They also have influencing ability.  One of 
the main issues concerns building codes.  RCI Monterey is not using market standards for 
housing.  Instead, DA RCI pushed down to the local office the standards to be used in all 
the buildings.  This takes away from innovation on the side of the contractor.   
DA RCI also trained the local RCI office on the CDMP.  All the internal 
stakeholders were involved in this training.  When problems arose during the 
development of the CDMP, DA RCI were the ones that usually received a call by the 
local office for help.  Moreover, DA RCI is overall in charge of the entire program.  They 
are very supportive of all the privatization sites and do what they can to help in every 




2.   The Housing Construction/Property Management Industry 
The RCI office selected civilian construction companies with a solid performance 
history for quality and timeliness.  Housing industry finds privatization very attractive for 
several reasons.  First and foremost is the high and continual demand for on-post housing 
and the long-term partnership with the government.  Many of the issues that Clark 
Pinnacle brought to the attention of the local RCI office were worked out through the 
CDMP process.  During the six-months of developing the CDMP, Clark Pinnacle and the 
RCI office worked hand in hand on the details of the plan.  This included real estate 
appraisals, land surveys, building surveys, environmental assessments, and professional 
planning and design services.  Obviously, civilian contractors play a vital role in RCI and 
support this initiative.  Clark Pinnacle has worked and continues to work hand in hand in 
this partnership with the military.  (Collier, 2003) 
3.    Service Members 
As the recipients of the change, the service members and spouses provided input 
and recommendations that eventually got included in the CDMP. For the most part, the 
service members are supporters of this program.  In talking with several of them, there 
are a few who do not like the arrangement, but the overwhelming majority loves the idea.  
One of the main concerns of the service members dealt with the floor plans and the 
amenity buildings.  During this meeting, the service members reviewed several of these 
plans and actually recommended changes to them.  These recommendations were 
approved to be included in the final floor plans.  By listening to the service members, the 
MBMH LLC quickly gained the favor of the change recipients.   
Other areas that concerned service members involved the allotment of the BAH to 
Clark-Pinnacle and the idea that civilians could possibly move into these new 
developments.  While the concern associated with the BAH allotment was taken care of 
through information briefings on how the process would work, there is still some 
uneasiness about the thought of civilians living in the communities.  On several 
occasions, the RCI office presented the privatization plan to the service members and 
ensured them that the military will always have the first opportunity to move into the 
43 
homes.  However, if there are vacant homes, the contractor does have the right to rent the 
home to civilians for the going market rate.   (Collier, 2003)    
4.    Congress/Local Governments 
 Even with the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative (MHPI) being implemented, adequate Congressional funding, on a continual 
basis, is vital.  As stated earlier, Congress must approve a contractor’s CDMP as the final 
“stamp of approval.”  Therefore, Congress plays a very important function in this process 
and fall into the mixed blessing category of stakeholders.  As for local governments, the 
City of Seaside brought the most grief to this program.  One of the areas of concern dealt 
with local taxes.  The city government wanted to place a local tax on the development.  
The local RCI office had to go to state court to get this issue resolved.  Other areas of 
concern dealt with land in general.  The Seaside’s city managers wanted more land turned 
over to the city.  However, all of the land that is currently under Federal property will be 
utilized in this development.  One of the ways the local RCI office dealt with the City of 
Seaside was through the use of Congressman Sam Farr’s office.  When the program 
manager could not reason with the city managers, he would have the Congressman’s 
office to call the city to resolve the issue.  This took place with several issues, another 
one of them being the environmental issues.  Many of these issues were brought to rests 
through the use of Congressman Farr.  
 Another area where Congress plays a vital role is under the Base Realignment and 
Closure process.  Within the next several years, Secretary Rumsfeld wants 20-30% of the 
current operating bases to be closed or realigned.  If this takes place, it will be interesting 
to see what happens with the current housing at those locations where privatization took 
place, to include the housing on the Monterey Peninsula.  According to the terms of the 
Army’s RCI project at Fort Meade, the real estate group contributed an undisclosed 
amount of cash for the project but also takes on certain risks, to include the possibility of 
the base closing.   (Chittum, 2003)   
5.   Local Communities/Businesses 
Each installation conducted seminars for members of the community, to include 
local businesses, to discuss RCI.  Local businesses main concern dealt with businesses 
opportunities that would be made available to them.  Because of this concern, they were 
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at first non-supportive of this program.  However, that quickly changed.  As with most 
contracts within the military, a large portion of the contract with the prime contractor will 
be subcontracted out.  This is also the case with privatized housing.  Local businesses 
were pleased to hear that Clark-Pinnacle subcontracted nearly 70% of the work related to 
the privatization program to small businesses and/or other businesses that fall under 
similar socio economic realm.  This work includes painting, carpeting, cleaning, and 
ground maintenance amongst others.  With this great of percentage given to local 
businesses, the local businesses and workforce became very content with this plan.  
Monterey is not the only location that is making local businesses happy.  This is a fairly 
normal procedure throughout the Army.  For instance, at Fort Hood, 80% of the work so 
far has been subcontracted by Actus to small businesses in Killen, TX.  (Chittum, 2003)  
By showing these statistics to local businesses, future programs should have no problems 
gaining the support of this stakeholder group.   
C. SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS 
1. Request for Qualifications  
The Monterey RCI office followed the standard two-step RFQ procedure that was 
outlined in Chapter III.  The Army RCI Program Manager, working through the Corps of 
Engineers, issued the RFQ for California.  This RFQ covered bases and installations 
throughout California.  Contractors interested in bidding on any of the locations were 
required to respond to the first step of this RFQ.  Twenty-two contractors provided their 
qualifications in response to the RFQ.  An evaluation board consisting of five members 
then reviewed these qualifications.  The board members consisted of Army RCI 
personnel, the Monterey RCI PM, and a National Guard representative.  The first step of 
the two-step RFQ process determines the competitive range for a group of sites using the 
five evaluation factors discussed in Chapter three.  As a result of this first step, three 
contractors made it into the competitive range: Clark Pinnacle Family Communities LLC, 
J.A. Jones Community Development LLC, and Lend Lease Actus LLC.   
The Monterey RCI PM invited these three contractors to present an oral proposal 
to the Monterey office.  Each contractor was given a twenty-four hour period to make his 
or her presentations.  Their presentations were centered on the four factors for step two of 
the RFQ discussed in Chapter three.  After these presentations, the Monterey RCI office 
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awarded the contract to Clark Pinnacle Family Communities LLC on July 9th, 2002.  The 
contract provided Clark Pinnacle $350,000 to work with the Monterey RCI office in 
developing the Community Development Management Plan. 
2. Community Development Management Plan 
The Monterey RCI office personnel went through extensive CDMP training 
conducted by DA RCI personnel.  This training included all of the key internal 
stakeholders.  Once this training concluded, the Monterey RCI office and Clark Pinnacle 
began what would become a seven-month project of putting together the CDMP.  By 
working through this process, both parties brought forth issues and were able to resolve 
them while growing a strong business relationship.  Clark Pinnacle provided their vision 
in the proposal they submitted in step two of the RFQ.  The Executive Advisory Board, 
the name given to the mix of Monterey RCI office personnel and Clark Pinnacle 
personnel took this vision and, over seven months, crafted a detailed business plan called 
the CDMP.   
One of the key steps to the CDMP was the inclusion of external stakeholders’ 
thoughts and concerns regarding this project.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
external stakeholders brought many new ideas that the RCI office and Clark Pinnacle 
included in the final CDMP.   
Once the CDMP was finalized, the Monterey RCI PM staffed it through the 
Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Congress.  
Congress approved the CDMP for Monterey Bay and the United States Army and Navy 
transferred responsibility of government housing over to Clark Pinnacle LLC on 1 
October 2003.    
D.    MANAGING CHANGE 
Change succeeds when an entire organization participates in the effort. (Jick, 
2003)  Professor Jick provides organizations a guide to implementing change he calls the 
Ten Commandments.  These commandments serve as a guide to change implementers, 
the personnel responsible for shaping, enabling, orchestrating, and facilitating a 
successful change.  Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Army’s 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management are the change strategists.  When the 
Army’s Program Manager for RCI and the Presidio of Monterey/NPS, who in this case 
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represent the change implementers, decided to implement RCI at this location, a Program 
Executive Office (PM), led by the program manager Patrick Kelley, was placed in charge 
of the program and he quickly assembled a team.  This Office is responsible for the 
implementation, and all program planning, policies and procedures for the transition of 
current Army and Navy Family Housing inventory, including maintenance and 
management responsibilities to a private sector developer.  This highly complex process 
involves selection of a developer, formation of a public/private corporation, development 
of a comprehensive Community Development Management Plan, including a 
Development Plan, Financial Plan, and Transition Plan, which involves economic 
architectural and engineering analyses and reviews. (Collier, 2003)  Following is a view 
of how the PM RCI implemented the change, using Jick’s Ten Commandments as a 
model. 
1.    Analyze the Organization and Its Need for Change 
We have already discussed the need for change in military housing in general and 
in Army housing specifically.  Congress’ action rendered most discussion moot.  When 
the services were slow to implement the Congressional mandate while studying the 
issues, Congress prodded the services to get moving. 
2.    Create a Shared Vision and Common Direction 
When Mr. Kelley began implementing RCI in Monterey, he created his own 
temporary vision and direction.  As part of the transformation, a civilian contractor, Clark 
Pinnacle, Inc., was chosen to perform the construction and manage the property.  Clark 
Pinnacle, Inc. and the PM then sat down together over a two to three week period to form 
a permanent vision statement and agree on a common direction.  Additionally, after 
selection of Clark Pinnacle the Army and Clark Pinnacle worked together for six months 
to create the Community Development Management Plan that was submitted to 
Congress.  A successful vision serves to guide behavior and aid an organization in 
achieving its goals.  Additionally, the CDMP provides detailed direction for the entire  
program.  The key to the success of this vision and Plan, however, was not in their 
crafting, but rather in the way they were presented to the community and the soldiers.  
The PM conducted several “town hall” meetings with the military members and their 
families as well as with members and businesses in the local community.  At these 
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meetings, the PM, which also includes the base commander, explained the rationale 
behind the change and how it would affect all the stakeholders involved.  Clearly, this 
change would translate into a better living environment for the military family.  The PM 
also allowed and utilized the recommendations put forth by the audience in these 
meetings.  By doing this, the PM incorporated the change recipients into the decision 
making process creating a sense of ownership.  The PM successfully created a shared 
vision by effectively communicating to the military families and local authorities the 
benefits of the change and the positive or negative ramifications that would occur if 
change did or did not take place.  (Collier, 2003) 
3.    Separate from the Past 
This was perhaps the easiest task for Army RCI to accomplish.  Fifty years’ of 
failed housing programs and declining housing quality made separating from the past 
easy.  Not all stakeholders are convinced that privatization is the best alternative, but all 
are convinced that the old policies were not working. 
4.    Create a Sense of Urgency 
When the Army adopted RCI as the way to fix their housing problem, they 
established 2010 as the target year for completely integrating the program at 43 
installations.  Senior officials in the Army then decided that 2010 was not soon enough 
and ordered all the installations to have the program implemented by 2007.  Senior 
officials, most notably President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, pushed this 
requirement down to the services because they understood the urgent need for housing.  
The middle managers, in this case the PM at each installation, also understood the need to 
move the timetable forward.  The PM office in Monterey agreed with senior officials that 
the housing needed fixed sooner than later.  They took the initiative and became the fifth 
installation in the Army to implement this program.  Moreover, the Army deals with 
privatization in two ways: either tearing down old homes and building new ones or 
renovating the older homes.  The PM in Monterey and senior military officials realized 
the need to replace, not renovate, the housing on Fort Ord, the Presidio, and LaMesa 
village.  (Collier, 2003)  Although senior officials created a sense of urgency in the 
Army, local officials created an even greater sense of urgency and communicated this 
with both the strategists and the recipients alike. 
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5.    Support a Strong Leader Role 
As shown earlier, the process of implementing such a drastic change is very 
complex and time consuming.  Mr. Kelly, along with the installation commander, took it 
upon himself to lead Monterey through this change.  Because of the size and complexity 
of the change, one person alone could not effectively lead this change.  The PM and 
military officials effectively established leadership roles.  Whereas the installation 
commander dealt more with communicating and leading the military members and their 
families, Mr. Kelly dealt more with planning the construction and creating an 
implementation plan with Clark Pinnacle, Inc.  By understanding the need for a dual 
leadership role and effectively practicing it, the PM and the military were able to create a 
solid vision and motivate both the civilian contractor and the military families to embrace 
this change.  As with anything, strong leadership can make or break an organization.  
Sometimes, as is the case with RCI in Monterey, that leadership role must be divided into 
parts in order to be effective. 
6.    Line Up Political Sponsorship 
Since RCI evolved directly from Congressional direction, political sponsorship 
was already lined up.   The history of RCI reminds us that Congressional support 
sometimes dissipates at an astonishing rate, leading us to suggest an addition to this 
Commandment.  Instead of simply lining up political sponsorship, we suggest Line Up 
Political Sponsorship and manage it throughout the life of the program.  
As noted earlier, the change recipients play a vital role in determining long-term 
success. The change strategists and implementers must gain broad-based support 
throughout the organization.  One of the ways to do this is to develop relationships with 
and obtain support from the right people within the organization.  In Monterey, those 
“right people” are the Superintendent at NPS and the Superintendent at the Defense 
Language Institute.  The PM and the senior military officials gained the support of these  
two officers early in the process by demonstrating the benefits that RCI would have for 
their commands.  It was also easy to start with these two officers because both were 
thought to be receptive of this change.  Not only did they embrace the change, but they 
also made RCI a high priority at each installation.  For example, the Superintendent at 
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NPS provided his Superintendent’s Guest Lecture time to the PM office to brief all 
military families on the change process.     
We should note that not everyone will embrace and support any change and RCI 
is no exception.  However, the PM did gain the unanimous support of the military 
members and the support of key leaders, or “political sponsors,” early in the process that 
facilitated others to follow. 
7.    Craft an Implementation Plan 
The Monterey RCI PM and Clark Pinnacle collaborated on their Community 
Development Master Plan.  This plan was discussed in detail earlier in this chapter. 
8.    Develop Enabling Structures  
The basic enabling structure for the Army was already in place—the Army Chief 
of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM).  In turn, the ACSIM appointed Program 
Managers for each site to define and operate RCI.  ACSIM also defined the basic strategy 
of soliciting for contractors.  PM RCI then selected Clark Pinnacle as its partner, and the 
two formed a limited liability corporation. 
9.    Communicate, Involve People, and Be Honest 
Change leaders should communicate openly, and should seek out the involvement 
and trust of people throughout their organization. (Jick, 2003)  The PM and senior 
military officials in Monterey clearly followed this guiding principle of Jick’s.  From the 
outset, communication between all parties--the strategists, implementers and recipients--
provided a sound relationship.  By having the “town-hall” meetings with the military 
families and allowing their voices and ideas to be heard, the PM gained credibility and 
the trust of the families.  By listening and incorporating the ideas of the families instead 
of directing change, the PM gained a better understanding of the needs of the families. 
10.    Reinforce and Institutionalize the Change 
The CDMP has been constructed, submitted and approved.  The PM and Clark 
Pinnacle have formed a corporation.  Leases have been signed, BAH assigned, and 
financing secured.  These structures and mechanisms are difficult to reverse.  Whether 




E.    CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Service members living on the Monterey Peninsula are going to reap the benefits of the 
Residential Communities Initiative for years to come.  The Monterey Bay Military 
Housing Limited Liability Corporation composed of Clark Pinnacle and the United States 
Government underwent a successful transition of government housing to privatized 
housing.  The Monterey RCI office managed the change properly and acted upon both 
internal and external stakeholders’ concerns.  The Source Selection Process and the 
development of the CDMP went fairly smoothly.   One area that Mr. Kelley would have 
improved is in the knowledge of the local governments.  As part of the local RCI office, 
he believes a better understanding of the local governments could have been 
accomplished if a local official was part of the integrated team.  Either way, the Monterey 
RCI office did a commendable job in the transition of housing from Government owned 





V. ANALYSIS OF RCI 
A. INTRODUCTION:  MILITARY HOUSING IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET 
 We still have a funding shortage for military housing.  That has not 
changed since DoD assumed responsibility for housing its military families in 1948 or 
since DoD decided that housing is not a core competency in 1992. (Spigelmyer, 2003)   
 As the following chart illustrates, barring significant changes to mandatory 
programs and entitlements, increasing the relative size of the Defense budget to fund the 
Army’s $7 billion shortfall, means decreasing the non-defense discretionary budget—the 
budget that was expected to increase with the end of the Cold War.  Deficit spending  
 




changes the relative proportions of the budget.  Defense may benefit from deficit 
spending in one on more years, but deficit spending increases the relative size of the Net 
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Interest wedge, requiring a parallel decrease in one or more other wedges or more deficit 
spending.  Since neither mandatory appropriations nor other entitlements are likely to 
decrease, the decreases must come from either National Defense or Non-Defense 
Discretionary or both.   
The Congressional Budget Office projects that entitlements and mandatory 
programs will consume increasing proportions of the federal budget.  In 1990 they 
amounted to 60% of federal outlays.  They are projected to reach 74% by 2010.  “. . 
.federal agencies will continue to fight for a dwindling slice of discretionary dollars and, 
as the slice of defense spending declines, the battle carries over to an internal struggle 
within DoD.”  (LtCol Warren M. Anderson, USAF, LTC John J. McGuiness, USA, and 
CDR John S. Spicer, USN; “And the Survey says. . .the Effectiveness of DoD 
Outsourcing and Privatization Efforts;”  Acquisition Review Quarterly, Spring 2002.)  
 
Figure 5 - 2:  Military Family Housing as a Percentage of the Defense Budget 
 
Source:  www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1999/b)2011999bt032-99.htm 
 
Furthermore, recent tax cuts do not decrease mandatory programs or entitlements.  















Discretionary Domestic programs or increases in the deficit.  Thus, decreases in the 
Defense budget are likely.   
Further, given the pressure to decrease the Defense budget, the competition 
between the services and within each service for funding increases.  The small proportion 
of funding for military family housing, illustrated above, is more likely to shrink than to 
expand because the services routinely opt for weapon systems over housing.       
Recognizing the unlikelihood of funding to meet housing shortages, an Army 
Tiger Team, including the current Army RCI Program Manager, recommended 
alternative approaches for funding military housing to Congress.  These alternatives 
became the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) in the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1996. (Spigelmyer, 2003) 
B. BUDGET SCORING  
The twelve MHPI authorities—the twelve tools in the privatization toolbox-- form 
the basis for each service’s privatization program.  But the tools in the MHPI toolbox are 
not equally useful.  The Office of Management and Budget associates a budget “score” 
with each of twelve authorities in accordance with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-508].  These budget scores, listed in Table 5-1, estimate impacts 
on the current year’s budget.  For example, conveyance or lease of Government land or 
housing units, building to local codes, building support facilities, and payment of rent by 
allotment all have budget scores of 0%.  None of these affects the current year’s budget.   
Under this scheme Government land provided as the Government’s equity in a 
public-private partnership or corporation is valueless.  In contrast, investing Government 
funds in a joint venture, guaranteeing rentals, and requiring service members to occupy 
new housing have budget scores approaching 100% of the value of the investment, 
rentals, and BAH.  Such oddities suggest that OMB and Congress are likely to reconsider 
the budget scoring, especially those scores that value the Government’s real property at 





Both OSD’s Office of Competitive Sourcing and Privatization and the Army’s 
PM for RCI report that budget scores are important, even definitive, when considering 
which of the tools in the toolkit a service will use to repair or replace military family 
housing. (Helwig & Spigelmyer, 2003)   For example, in Monterey the RCI PM offered 
the land and buildings in the Army’s Ord Military Community and the Navy’s La Mesa 
Village as equity for its 49% share in a public-private corporation, eventually called the 
Monterey Bay Military Housing LLC. (Collier, 2003)  Monterey’s combination of Army 
and Navy land and housing is the first joint-service housing initiative under MHPI.   
Although land is at a premium in and around Monterey, contributing the land and 
housing at Ord Military Community, La Mesa Village, and Presidio of Monterey will 
have no impact on the defense budget.  Because of budget scoring, DoD’s real property 
has no budgetary value.  In contrast, had the Army and Navy pledged the cash value of 
the land and housing for their share in the corporation, the entire cash amount would have 
been counted as an expenditure in the year the pledge was made.  This would have 
required a Congressional appropriation.  (Else) 
Not surprisingly, the new housing planned for Monterey uses the following three 
of the four authorities with 0% budget scores: (1) The Army and the Navy made their 
land and existing housing available to Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC for the new 
housing.  All the existing housing will eventually be demolished and replaced.  (2) The 
Monterey developments will also include ancillary facilities--infrastructure, community 
centers, community swimming pools, etc.  And (3) rent will be paid through allotment of 
BAH.  In effect, using the “free” MHPI authorities, Monterey’s RCI PM leveraged the 
Army’s and Navy’s land, housing, and future BAH to purchase 49% of a limited liability 
corporation which then borrowed $450 million from private lenders to finance the new 
housing in Monterey and Seaside, California.  The expected BAH and commercial rents 
represent the cash flow that justifies the loan.  (Collier, 2003) 
 1.   Building Codes 
Initially, the Army intended to build to local codes, in accordance with the other 
MHPI initiative with a 0% budget score.  That policy has recently changed with the 
publication of Army-wide standards for family housing. (Spigelmeyr)  Those standards 
are available on the Army’s RCI website.  Army RCI and the local RCI PMs apply the 
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Army-wide standards in conjunction with local standards.  Local building codes vary, but 
the Army’s standards are generally more stringent than local ones.  For Monterey, the 
Army’s standards are stricter than local codes. Use of stricter building standards certainly 
drives up building costs, but higher quality constructions may justify the increased cost.  
Predictably, conflicts among the Army’s standards and between the Army’s standards 
and local ones lead to considerable negotiation between the Army and its corporate 
partners.  Such conflicts may also lead to delays in receiving permits and approvals from 
local authorities. (Collier, 2003)   
 2.   Real Property as Corporate Equity 
The Corporation started fiscal year 2004 with the transfer of 2268 units, 1,675 
from the Army and 593 from the Navy.  It will demolish and not replace a 50-unit 
apartment building on the Presidio.  The Defense Language Institute will use the land for 
instructional purposes.  Eventually, as the units at La Mesa Village are demolished and 
replaced, they will be spread out a bit, yielding nine fewer units.  After construction is 
complete, the Corporation will own and manage 2209 units.  Importantly, demolition and 
construction will proceed gradually over the next eight years.  As a result, the new 
military housing communities will take shape slowly through 2012.   
Table 2 and the two maps, following, indicate the order of construction.   
 
Table 5-2   Monterey RCI Construction Schedule 
 
Construction Begins Neighborhood 
1st quarter 2004          Ord - Hayes Park 
1st quarter 2004   La Mesa - Wherry Grove 
2nd quarter 2005   Ord – Fitch Park 
1st quarter 2006   La Mesa - Wherry Grove 
3rd quarter 2006   Ord – Fitch Park 
2nd quarter 2007   La Mesa - Terrace Oaks 
4th quarter 2007   Ord - Upper Stillwell Park 
2nd quarter 2008   La Mesa - Capehart Forest/La Mesa Cliffs 
4th quarter 2008   Ord - Marshall Park 
2nd quarter 2009   La Mesa - Pineview Townhomes 
4th quarter 2009   Ord - Marshall Park 
4th quarter 2010   Ord - Lower Stilwell Park 
4th quarter 2011   Ord - Lower Stilwell Park 
3rd quarter 2012   Ord - Lower Stilwell Park 
 Authors, based on data from the Monterey RCI website 
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Figure 5 - 3:  OMC Building Map 
          
Source: From Monterey RCI website 
 
 
Figure 5 - 4:  La Mesa Village Building Map  
                                                           
Source: From Monterey RCI website 
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C. THE ECONOMICS OF RCI 
1. Incentives for Builders and Property Managers 
If the entire amount of BAH went for construction, property management, and 
servicing the debt, then the private-sector firms would have little incentive to participate 
in RCI’s public-private corporations.  Exact fee structures for RCI projects are 
proprietary, but the Army RCI website contains general guidance on the fees private 
companies can expect to collect for participation in RCI Corporations.  A copy of that 
guidance is in Appendix C.  A summary of that general guidance follows: 
Property/Asset Management: 3% - 5% of gross rent for available units  
less vacant units 
  
Development Management: 3% - 5% of total projected development 
costs 
 
Construction Management: 3% to 6% of projected total “hard” cost of 
construction 
 
Other fees: None 
 
Return on Invested Equity: Minimal, based only on at-risk equity 
 
The Government and the contractor negotiate exact fees, including the automatic and 
incentive proportions, during development of the CDMP.  The Army’s guidance suggests 
that a “material proportion” of Property/Asset Management and Construction 
Management Fees should be performance-based and that the entire Development 
Management Fee should be “at risk” if the developer fails to meet milestones.  Projected 
costs are determined during development of the CDMP.  They are not actual costs. 
 Appendix C also contains a description of how the Corporation will determine the 
incentive fee portion of the Property Management Fee at Fort Meade.  The overall 
Property Management Fee at Fort Meade is 5%; 2% (2/5 of the total fee) is the maximum 
incentive Picerne, Fort Meade’s corporate partner, can earn.  Award of the incentive 
proportion is based on customer service, maintenance response, occupancy, budget, and 
quality of life, weighted equally.      
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 See also paragraph I4: Cost plus Percentage of Cost, below for a discussion of 
some of the dangers and unintended consequences of basing a contractor’s fee on the 
actual or projected costs of a project.  
2.   Basic Housing Allowance  
In some high-cost locations, like Monterey, California, service members found 
that market forces had driven up the cost of housing so that rental costs exceeded BAH.  
To offset the difference in BAH and commercial rents, the Army and Navy provided 
affordable housing for service members and their families.  Essentially the Army and 
Navy offered service members the choice of Government housing with no BAH or full 
BAH which service members could apply to housing in the commercial rental market.  
Sixty-eight percent of the service members at the Naval Postgraduate School and the 
Defense Language Institute chose to live in La Mesa or the Ord Military Community.  
Evidence of long waiting lists at the Monterey military housing office indicates that the 
percentage might have been higher had more housing units been available.  Brad Collier, 
Deputy Program Manager for Monterey’s RCI office, reports that a Housing Needs 
Assessment of the Monterey Area indicates the need for more than 2,209 units but that 
DoD’s land will support no more housing units.  (Collier, 10/29)    
Increasing BAH to eliminate out-of-pocket housing expenses should change the 
equation considerably.  In his President’s Management Agenda for FY2002, President 
Bush reiterated his commitment to reducing average out-of-pocket expenses for housing 
to zero by 2005.  “This will enable more military families to leave inadequate 
government housing and rent quality private-sector housing in the local communities 
around DoD installations.”  Figure 5-3 shows the progression to zero percent average out-
of-pocket expenses for service members. 
Service members’ choices may change as BAH approaches and equals 
commercial rents in the area.  Under RCI agreement, service members can choose 
whether to live in Corporation (military) or private-sector housing.  If a significant 
proportion of potential renters choose to rent private-sector housing, the Corporation’s 
financial projections may require rethinking.  This is especially true during the eight-year 
building period when existing housing, which costs the same BAH as the new housing, 
may appear especially cramped and unattractive.  
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Figure 5 - 5:  President’s Plan to Eliminate Out-of-Pocket Expenses 
 
 
More than any other single factor, this ability to choose disciplines the 
Corporation’s practices.  If the Corporation does not build and maintain nice 
neighborhoods, potential military and civilian renters may choose to spend their housing 
dollars with private-sector landlords.   
But rental housing is in short supply around Monterey, and the Corporation has 
agreed to fill all vacant housing—housing not occupied by military families—with 
civilian renters, typically at open market rates.     
 3.  The Economics of Location 
The economics of each agreement, and each Corporation or partnership, depends 
on the local housing market around each location. Around Forts Irwin and Polk there is 
little private-sector housing available for military families.  There is also little 
commercial competition with new military family housing.  BAH for Fort Irwin is less 
than for Monterey.  Property values in and around Fort Irwin are lower than around 
Monterey, and units constructed for Fort Irwin will command lower rents than those in 
Monterey.  If competition with the private sector is a major motivating factor for the 
Army’s public-private partnerships, finding adequate motivation for those sites where 




Further, the feasibility of civilian occupation of vacant housing may depend on 
whether that housing is inside the fence of a closed installation.  In Monterey, all the new 
housing, except for historic houses at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Presidio, is 
accessible to the public.  At Fort Meade, for example, the new housing is inside the fence.  
In short, the economics of individual projects will certainly be different from Monterey’s.  
Land and existing housing alone may provide insufficient equity to attract corporate 
partners at Fort Irwin, Fort Polk, etc.  
To increase the attractiveness of some smaller or more isolated sites, the Army 
packaged them with other sites.  For example, Fort Irwin alone might not attract potential 
corporate partners.  So, the Army “packaged” Fort Irwin, Parks Reserve Forces Training 
Area, and Moffett Federal Airfield.   
 4. Return on Investment 
Rental housing differs from other commodities in the time required to earn a 
return on investment.  Commonly in the U.S., homebuilders finance the costs of a 
commercial housing development, selling their houses to buyers, most of whom obtain 
thirty-year mortgages.  But in the case of the Army’s projects, neither the residents nor 
the Government will buy the newly constructed housing.  It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, that property owners might require twenty-five or fifty-years to recover the 
costs of construction, service the debt, and repay the principal. 
 5. Corporate Income and Expenses  
Although the existing housing in Monterey is deteriorating and will be 
demolished and replaced in the next eight years, its contribution to the Corporation is not 
trivial.   Specific cost and income data is proprietary, but we can make some educated 
guesses about the shape of the Corporation’s financing.  If we assume that average BAH 
for the Monterey area is $2000 per month, then the Corporation gains $2000 per month 
for every rented unit.  2200 units @ $2000 each = $4.4 million in income per month.  Of 
course, that amount must be adjusted for uninhabitable units and for those under 
construction at any time.   
Depending on the speed of demolition and construction, it appears that 200 to 300 
units will be under construction at any time.  For example, initial construction in La Mesa 
begins with the vacant land in the Wherry Grove neighborhood.  Subtracting 200 or 300 
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from 2276, depending on when the Corporation demolishes the apartment building on the 
Presidio, for example, leaves approximately 1900 to 2000 revenue-producing units 
throughout the construction period.  1900 units @ $2000/unit/month = $3.8 
million/month or $45.6 million/year.  2000 units @ $2000/unit/month = $4 million per 
month or $48 million/year.  Stretching our construction for eight years makes good 
economic sense.   
We are not experts in corporate finance or housing industry costs.  But we know 
that servicing a $450 million debt would consume a considerable proportion of the 
Corporation’s income, depending on how much of that loan is outstanding at any given 
time.  Considering, for example that the Corporation collects $3.8 to $4 million per 
month and intends to construct 200 to 300 housing in the coming year, it does not seem 
likely that the Corporation will borrow the entire $450 million and paying interest on it. 
Maintaining the existing aging units through the construction period will also 
increase the Corporation’s costs.  Based on its construction schedule, the Corporation can 
easily calculate how much rent a unit will yield and therefore, which expenses to incur, 
which to defer, and which to avoid altogether. 
D. TRADING BAH FOR MILCON   
Congress would not appropriate $450 million per year for new housing in 
Monterey, but it is willing to pay considerably more than $50 million per year in BAH 
indefinitely.  If 68% of the military personnel assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School 
and the Defense Language Institute live in 2268 military family housing units, then 
approximately 3385 military personnel are eligible for BAH and military housing.  At 
$2000 each, total BAH for the area is more than $80 million per year.  The Corporation 
stands to collect $50 million per year, which it will use to repay the financed cost of new 
housing in Monterey and other expenses in Monterey.  The Army RCI PM commented 
that $450 million exceeds the Army’s entire family housing appropriation for FY04 and 
that little or no savings will result from shifting the funding from MILCON appropriation 
to BAH. (Spigelmeyr, 2003)  
E. RELATIVE “PRIVATENESS” 
The relative “privateness” of the Army’s projects is under constant scrutiny.  The 
Monterey Bay Military Housing Corporation, LLC, borrowed $450 million from a 
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private lender, pledging BAH and commercial rents to repay the loans.  Since agencies of 
the federal Government cannot routinely seek private financing, the Corporation must be 
seen as something other than an agency of the federal Government.  OSD reports that 
OMB’s view is split, that Congress is more or less ambivalent, and that the Congressional 
Budget Office is opposed to the Army’s public-private organizations. (Helwig, 2003)   
Thus, OSD cringes when Army officials speak of “firing” an under performing 
contractor.  Partners do not “fire” partners.  And corporate stockholders do not “fire” 
other stockholders.  Similarly,  waiving property taxes on a project because the local 
taxing authority views a public-private venture as a Governmental entity would 
jeopardize the corporation’s “privateness.”    
It would be unfortunate if a misunderstanding jeopardized the “privateness” of 
Monterey’s project.  When Monterey RCI personnel speak of firing a construction 
company or a property management company, they are not speaking of firing a corporate 
partner.  Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC contracted with Clark Construction to 
demolish and construct the new housing at La Mesa and Fort Ord and with Pinnacle 
Properties to manage existing and new construction.  When RCI personnel speak of firing 
a company, they are referring to the companies with whom the Corporation has 
contracted. (Collier, 2003)   
In case any doubts linger, the relationship between the owners of the Corporation 
is not a contractual one.  The only contracts in this relationship are (1) the $350,000 
contract the Army awarded to Clark-Pinnacle to prepare the Community Development 
Management Plan (CDMP) and (2) the contracts the Corporation issued to Clark 
Construction for building housing and amenities and to Pinnacle for managing that 
property.  Theoretically, either of these last contracts could be ended for cause.  However, 
Government contract law does not govern the relationship 
F. THE TREND TOWARD PRIVATIZATION  
The trend in Government over the last twenty years has been to privatize 
functions that are not core competencies.  The Government seeks commercial sources for 
activities which are not considered inherently Governmental.  As previously stated, the 
Department of Defense decided in 1992 that military housing is not a core competency 
(Spigelmeyr, 2003), opening the way to privatization.   
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A public corporation for military housing was considered in the early ‘90s.  Such 
a corporation would have incorporated local housing offices into a public corporation, 
which could then have been funded with BAH.  Probably special legislation would have 
been required for such a corporation, and it is doubtful whether such a public corporation 
could have leveraged private financing to accomplish its goals.   
A public corporation would have amounted to a half-measure since DoD had 
already decided that housing was not a core competency.  And a public corporation 
would simply have institutionalized (incorporated) a housing program that was already 
failing.  Instead, DoD, with Army as the lead, decided to tap the expertise of the 
commercial marketplace and avail itself of the advantages of competition, neither of 
which would necessarily have been accomplished by a public corporation.   These 
decisions then formed the basis for MHPI, with each service allowed the freedom to 
apply them in service-unique ways.     
G. COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 
Paralleling the trend toward privatization is the movement toward commercial 
practices in Government acquisition.  As the number of Government contractors shrink 
and as the commercial marketplace replaces the Government as the primary source for 
technological innovation, pressure builds to reduce unique Governmental requirements 
and restrictions in favor of commercial practices.   
Commercial and industry specifications have replaced military and government-
unique specifications and standards.  The Army’s decision to use Army-wide 
construction standards instead of relying on local building codes runs counter to this 
trend.  We are encouraged to use performance specifications instead of DoD’s traditional 
detailed specifications to use the creativity of the marketplace.  Replacing traditional 
statements of work with simpler and broader statements of objectives also maximizes 
reliance on the expertise and creativity of the commercial marketplace.  Nowhere is the 
change more profound than in relationships between the Government and its contractors.  
Rather than the suspicious, arms-length relationships that characterized Government-
contractor relationships, we are encouraged to treat our contractors as partners in 
continuing mutually profitable relationships. 
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In this commercial-partner context, the Army’s public-private limited-liability 
corporations and limited-liability partnership can be considered a major step toward 
applying commercial practices to military housing.  Commercial corporations commonly 
form joint ventures, and now the Army joins with private companies to form corporations 
(a partnership at Fort Hood) to privatize and modernize Army family housing.   
H.   JACQUES GANSLER ON MARKET-BASED GOVERNMENT 
It is easy to be fooled into believing that RCI’s two-step process is about 
acquiring housing.  The process includes an RFQ.  It evaluates responses using source 
selection procedures.  The second step uses oral proposals and results in a contract to 
develop a business plan (the CDMP).  Developing the CDMP looks very much like 
Alpha contracting.  This selection process is more accurately about selecting a partner for 
a corporation that will build housing.   One could reasonably argue that the two-step 
process is not an acquisition at all; it is an elaborate application process followed by a job 
interview.   The process certainly weeds out unqualified applicants, and it probably 
results in selection of the best-qualified applicant.  
After Congress approved the joint Government/developer CDMP, the Army and 
Clark-Pinnacle Family Communities, LLC, formed a corporation whose goal is to build 
and maintain housing.  The Corporation then contracted with Clark Construction for 
demolition of existing housing and construction of new housing and with Pinnacle Realty 
Management for management of the existing and new properties.  The Army PM for RCI 
and Monterey’s Deputy PM for RCI say that the Corporation (Monterey Bay Military 
Housing, LLC, in Monterey) can fire the construction company (Clark, in Monterey) or 
the property management company (Pinnacle, in Monterey).  (Spigelmyer, 2003 & 
Collier, 2003)  It is less clear whether selection of Clark Construction to build new 
houses and Pinnacle Management to manage the housing was a necessary outcome of the 
two-step selection.  If not, then these are sole source commercial contracts.  Since the 
Corporation—a commercial entity--issued these contracts, they are not covered by the 
FAR.   
From the point-of-view of Government contracting, the arrangement is very 
confusing.  To assist a Government unfamiliar with the rules of the commercial 
marketplace Jacques Gansler outlined some broad guidelines for privatization in “Moving 
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Toward Market-Based Government:  The Changing Role of Government as the 
Provider.”  In this analysis we are somewhat handicapped by RCI’s determination that 
CDMPs, including Monterey’s, are proprietary, preventing access to them.      
Prof. Gansler’s Four Principles of Program Delivery can assist us in our move 
toward privatization and commercial practices.  The next several sections consider how 
these principles apply to the Army’s RCI program.  The four principles are:   
1. The key to success is shifting from a monopoly to a competitive environment; 
2. The competition must be run for “best value” rather than simply for low cost; 
3. Even when the Government contracts out work to be performed, it does not give 
up any of the control or management responsibilities; 
4. There is a critical need for detailed metrics. 
Since RCI is not essentially a Government contracting effort, we must translate 
such terms as “best value” to corporate behavior in a commercial marketplace.  If there 
were a contract between the Government and Clark-Pinnacle to build and maintain 
housing, we might, for example, look in Section E for quality assurance provisions and 
metrics.  This is no such contract.  Unfortunately, since the RCI PM would not allow 
access to the CDMP, we could not determine if that document contains any QA metrics.   
  1.   Shifting from Monopoly to Competition 
“The key to success is shifting from a monopoly to a competitive 
environment.  Simply shifting from a Government workforce to a private sector 
one while still in a monopoly environment does not create the incentives required 
to achieve the potential performance gains and cost reductions that competitive 
environment offers. Similarly, after an initial competitive award is made—either 
to the public sector workers or to the private sector—it is essential that the 
potential for future competition (in a few years) still be maintained. . . . It is the 
presence of competition (or even the clear potential for it) that forces the 
performer to innovate for higher performance at lower cost.” 
 
Prof. Gansler’s first principle refers to state-run monopolies, e.g., Washington, 
DC’s Metro system or San Francisco’s BART—a situation in which the Government 
provides a service and prevents others from competing.  Had the federal Government 
simply contracted out the U.S. Postal Service without relaxing the statutes and 




for a private one.  Nothing, except loss of volume, would have prevented the private 
replacement from raising its rates or providing poor service. 
Had the Government competitively contracted out the Postal Service without 
relaxing the statutes that regulate future competition we would be only a little better off.  
We might feel confident that we had awarded to the “best value” offeror, but we would 
still be at the mercy of a private monopoly.        
Instead, the Postal service was converted to a public corporation and the statutes 
and regulations that limited competition were relaxed.  So, if the Postal Service raises its 
rates for overnight mail, the consumer can opt for FedEx or UPS.  Both the presence of 
competition and the presence, or at least the threat, of continuing competition “. . . forces 
all performers to innovate for higher performance at lower cost.”  
a. Does RCI Eliminate or Reduce a Monopoly?   
 None of the installations considered under OSD’s MHPI or the Army’s 
RCI require service members to live in military housing.  Military family housing may 
constitute a niche market, but there are usually competitors for service members’ housing 
dollars. In Hawaii; Monterey, California; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and Fort Monmouth, 
New Jersey, military housing is not a monopoly.  Each of these locations offers private-
sector alternatives to military family housing.  Assuming that BAH is adequate for 
private-sector rents, service members can choose between military neighborhoods and a 
variety of private-sector ones.  In such cases RCI neither increases nor decreases chances 
of a monopoly. 
 In more isolated locations, whether military housing is a monopoly is less 
clear.   Fort Meade, Maryland is located between Washington, DC and Baltimore, 
Maryland.  There is little private-sector housing in the immediate vicinity of the Fort, but 
within thirty minutes to an hour’s drive are Baltimore, Washington, and their suburbs’ 
virtually unlimited private-sector markets.  Clearly, Fort Meade military housing is not a 
monopoly, but competition there is imperfect.  RCI neither increases nor decreases 
private-sector competition in locations like Fort Meade. 
 Forts Irwin and Polk are more clearly monopolistic.  While service 
members are not required to live on post, the posts are hardly surrounded by private-
sector rental housing.  There are few or no private-sector alternatives.  Additionally, there 
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are considerable blocks to entry into these housing markets.  Given the possibilities of 
base closure or reductions in force, builders are generally unwilling to accept the risks of 
developing private-sector housing around isolated bases.  While RCI’s increasing the 
numbers and quality of on-post housing may effectively reduce the demand for off-post 
housing; on balance, RCI neither increases nor decreases competition at isolated 
locations. 
 b. Does RCI Increase Competition or the Threat of Competition?     
 Just as RCI does not reduce the occurrence of monopoly in military 
housing, it also does not increase competition.  Further, where one of RCI’s public-
private partnerships or corporations simply replaces a housing office, it does not increase 
the threat of competition.  RCI argues that the threat of competition among builders and 
property managers will keep costs down and quality high. From a potential renter’s point-
of-view, the organization that provides housing is the same.  Its quality or responsiveness 
may fluctuate, but it is still Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC, for example.      
 The choices are not so clear-cut at other RCI sites.  At Fort Irwin, there is 
no commercial housing available outside the gates of the fort.  As a result, military 
housing is a virtual monopoly there.  Per Prof. Gansler, replacing a monopolistic military 
housing office with a monopolistic contractor, even if the initial solicitation is 
competitive, leaves little incentive to achieve the performance gains and cost reductions 
associated with the competitive marketplace.  We do not have the details about the 
agreements at Fort Irwin; but if those agreements mirror the agreements at other Army 
sites, there is little promise of future competition. 
c. Could RCI threaten continuing competition? 
 As long as RCI simply replaces local housing offices with a public-private 
organization, it neither increases nor decreases competition.  Increasing competition at 
both the prime and major subcontractor levels would benefit consumers.  The Army 
might, for example, borrow an idea from the Air Force and contract for preferential 
access to private-sector housing in return for Army land.  In locations like Fort Polk and 
Fort Irwin, “free” land would increase the incentives for private developers to build 
private-sector housing.  The preferential access might guarantee the Army the right of 
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first refusal on the new housing units.  Other incentives, like guaranteed loans and 
guaranteed tenancy, are possible but would be more expensive for Army RCI.   
Even if increasing competition at the “prime” contractor level is not 
feasible, competition at the subcontractor (builder and property manager) level would still 
offer clear advantages.  Commonly large housing developments use multiple builders, 
which increase the variety of housing and distribute the risk.  In Monterey, for example, 
might multiple builders have increased the speed with which new housing is constructed?  
When there is only one builder, the likelihood that an under-performing builder will be 
replaced is small.  Also, there is comparatively little incentive for the sole builder to 
innovate.  With multiple builders, replacement of an under performing builder is 
comparatively easier, builders compete, and such competition opens the way to offering 
future work as an incentive for excellence in design, construction and service.      
 2.  Best Value Competition 
“The competition must be run for “best value” rather than simply for “low 
cost.”  The idea . . .is not simply to get cheaper services; rather it is to get better 
services at lower costs.”    
 
RCI chooses its partners competitively, but the competitions are entirely based on 
technical and management expertise. They do not consider cost.  Step one of the two-step 
process evaluated twenty-two potential partners on Administrative Minimum 
Requirements (essentially pass/fail) and experience (with 8 subparts), financial 
capabilities, organizational capabilities (corporate level), past performance, and small 
business utilization.  The three potential partners who were judged to be in the 
competitive range then presented oral proposals with documentation.  The second-step 
proposals were judged on an installation-specific preliminary project concept statement, 
financial return, organizational capabilities, and small business utilization.     
The Request for Qualifications describes the process as “best value.”  Is technical 
excellence the same as best value?  Although we hope that technical excellence plays a 
part in the determination of best value, focusing on technical excellence without 
considering cost opens the way to excellent and expensive products.  It is easy to see how 
benefit derives from RCI’s process; it is less easy to demonstrate that it is the “greatest 
overall benefit.”     
70 
Regardless of the claim in their RFQs, RCI’s Request for Qualifications process 
and selections are not best value competitions.  RCI’s emphasis on factors other than 
price is as misdirected as is an over-riding emphasis on the lowest price.  Lowest price 
can result in cheap, inferior products. Failing to consider price can result in gold-plating.  
Certainly developing the CDMP jointly puts the Government in a position to limit gold-
plating, but without the counter-balancing influence of other contractors.   
It also means that the contract itself must be a “performance-based 
contract,” i.e., one that specifies what the buyer broadly is striving to achieve, but 
doesn’t tell the supplier how to do it. 
 
First, the agreement that joins the Army to Clark Pinnacle is not a contract.  The 
Community Development Management Plan development process that comes after 
selection of a contractor offers the contractor considerable input into the plan.  For 
example, the Army and Clark Pinnacle held public meeting during development of the 
CDMP.  During those meetings Clark Pinnacle proposed floor plans for the new houses.  
When military spouses proposed changes to those plans, Clark Pinnacle’s architects 
incorporated those recommendations into the plans.  If the purpose of a performance 
specification is to shift design responsibility and risk from the Government to the 
contractor, then RCI’s Alpha-contracting-like process is not quite a performance-based 
agreement.  As a co-developer of the CDMP, the Government still bears some of the 
responsibility and risk for the plan, but the process does rely considerably on the 
contractor’s expertise and creativity.   
Once the CDMP has been prepared, staffed, and approved, no competitive process 
follows.  The process to this point has considered only the cost of working with Clark-
Pinnacle to build and maintain housing.  While the process selects a well-qualified 
corporate partner and produces a good development and management plan; there is no 
evidence that, in executing that plan, the corporate partner will produce the best value for 
the Government or that a different corporate partner might not have produced more value 
with a different development plan.   
In the case of Monterey Bay Military Housing, LLC, the Corporation awarded a 
noncompetitive construction contract to Clark Construction and a management contract 
to Pinnacle Realty Management.  Might other construction and property management 
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contractors have provided better value than Clark and Pinnacle?  Might the Government 
have received better value from multiple construction contractors and multiple 
management companies?  With RCI’s process, we cannot know.              
3. Government Control 
“Even when the Government contracts out work to be performed, it does 
not give up any of the control or management responsibilities . . .. This means that 
the government still has a strong oversight function:  to manage the contract and 
monitor its performance and cost.  If the work is not done properly, the 
responsibility still rests with the government.”  
 
Again, RCI does not contract for housing.  Instead, it joins with a corporate 
partner to produce housing.  Prof. Gansler suggests that such a corporate arrangement 
does not relieve the Government of its responsibility to assure that the housing is of 
acceptable quality and is managed and maintained acceptably.   
Without access to the CDMP, it is impossible for us to know the extent to which it 
defines quality and timeliness.  We know that it contains a detailed construction and 
renovation schedule, and we know that it specifies a separate quality assurance 
contractor.  However, what is not clear is the Government’s enforcement rights should 
there be a performance issue.   
After acceptance of the CDMP and incorporation, the Government becomes a 
minority owner.  We are concerned about the enforcement provisions in the relationship 
at this point.  The Corporation can have volumes of operating rules and agreements, but 
that documentation is only as effective as its enforcement provisions.  The RCI PMs 
commented that they could fire an uncooperative or nonperforming builder or property 
manager.  Firing or otherwise controlling a majority partner is another issue altogether.   
The Corporation has contracted separately inspectors to assure quality.  We are, 
skeptical, however, about the authority of a quality assurance firm that is under contract 
to the Corporation.  The Corporation has also appointed a board with public and private 
members to oversee the housing communities.  Certainly the public members, e.g. the 
Superintendent of the Naval Postgraduate School, will be concerned for the quality of 
construction and maintenance.   
The Government quality assurance representative at Fort Meade commented that 
her role changed considerably when the Army joined with Picerne to build and renovate 
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housing.  As a Government inspector of contractors’ supplies and services, she was 
accustomed to rejecting nonconforming products.  But her role changed.  Instead of 
rejecting nonconforming material, she must now bring quality issues to the conference 
table where the corporation determines what to do about them.  She commented that she 
has been satisfied with the results, so far, but that the process is far more political and 
time-consuming than when she had direct control (Lawrence, 2003). 
Luckily for the Monterey RCI PM, the competitive nature of the commercial 
marketplace provides incentives for the Corporation to produce and maintain acceptable 
housing.  Otherwise, neither military not civilian renters will choose to live in it.  They 
have a choice.  But at Fort Meade, all the housing is inside the fence, reducing its appeal 
to private sector renters.  And private-sector housing, while plentiful, is a thirty-minute 
commute away.  The forces of the commercial market place should still be powerful 
enough to encourage building and maintaining attractive communities, but they are 
different from Monterey’s.  And what of Fort Irwin and Fort Polk and all other sites 
where there is not active and healthy competition in housing?   Those renters do not have 
a choice.   
4.   Metrics 
“There is a critical need for detailed metrics.”  Professor Gansler elaborates on his 
recommendations for effective management (see #3 above) by insisting on the need for 
early agreement on measures of cost and performance.  Probably we would add schedule” 
to cost and performance.  
Without access to CDMPs it is difficult to determine all the metrics they include.  
Based on the incentive fee information in Appendix C, we can conclude that the 
programs include significant, detailed metrics.  For example, the property management 
incentive fees at Fort Meade (the only documentation from any CDMP we were 
permitted to have) require customer service, maintenance service, financial, occupancy 
and quality of life metrics.  Fort Meade’s Commander will award the incentive portion of 
the contractor’s property management fee, based on these metrics. 
Based on the Army’s RCI fee guidance, also included in Appendix C, we infer 
that there are similar incentives and metrics for Development Management, Construction 
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Management, and Other.  Without access to the specific metrics, we are unable to access 
their potential effectiveness.      
I.   RISKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.   Functioning in the Commercial Market Place  
 Kristine Lawrence, Fort Meade RCI’s Assistant PM for Property Management 
noted a problem that others have mentioned but not emphasized.  She pointed out the 
Government personnel are at a disadvantage when working with Picerne.  She described 
public meetings, chaired jointly by Government and Picerne personnel, at which only the 
Picerne personnel spoke.  Additionally, she described the continuing pressure Picerne 
puts on the relationship.   
For example, their CDMP requires that Picerne maintain a Customer Service 
office, open for long hours.  But Picerne decided unilaterally to shorten those hours.  In 
response to the Government’s concern, Picerne commented that the CDMP is a guide but 
should not be taken literally.  As conditions change, the CDMP must change or be 
interpreted differently to fit the changing conditions.  Ms Lawrence commented that the 
Government’s reaction in several such situations is to concur, either tacitly or overtly 
with the contractor.   
She went on to explain that although Government personnel had been trained in 
writing a CDMP, they were not trained for day-to-day management of the project in 
cooperation with a contractor whose business is managing such projects.  The 
Government personnel feel unprepared to confront the contractor in his area of expertise.  
She noted that she had worked in the Fort Meade Housing Office for seventeen years and 
knew the housing regulation by heart, but that her prior experience and expertise had 
little or no application when working with Picerne.  (Lawrence, 2003) 
Ms Lawrence’s comments have important implications for RCI specifically and 
for the Government’s move toward commercial practices generally.  Government 
personnel have an array of tools for working with Government contracts.  Contracting 
personnel attend a dozen or more formal training classes.  They have years of experience 
with contracting problems.  When they encounter difficult contractual problems, they can 
consult attorneys who are experts in Government contract law or administrative 
personnel with years of experience managing contracts and contractors.  Where will they 
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look for expertise in dealing with a contractor in a commercial and corporate 
environment? 
The structure of Government contracting dictates that contractors must comply 
with rules written by and for the Government if they wish to do business with us. With 
RCI and many other commercial practices, the rules are changed.  Instead of contractors 
playing by Government rules, Government personnel play by the rules of the commercial 
market place.  For example, when the Army joins a developer in a public-private 
Corporation, it agrees to be bound by corporate law in the state in which their 
Corporation is chartered.  How many Government housing or contracting personnel or 
Government attorneys are experts in corporate law and commercial construction practices 
in California or Maryland?   
If we are to continue down this commercial practices path, we need considerably 
more training and experience in commercial practices.  Prof. Gansler cautions that we 
must retain oversight of the service and supplies we acquire through commercial 
methods.  Without training and experience in commercial practices, we are not prepared 
to protect the Government’s interest.        
2. Preparation for Government Tinkering 
The history of Military Housing contains several examples of Congressional 
intervention.   Congress complained that mortgage rates for Capehart Housing made the 
units more expensive than if funded with appropriated funds (which Congress had been 
unwilling to appropriate).  When the Kennedy administration scaled back Capehart, 
Congress appropriated funding to buy all the Capehart units outright.  Congress limited 
profits in Wherry Housing when a scandal loomed, dealing the program a deathblow.  We 
can only speculate what may happen if a developer complains to his Congressman that 
the Government is limiting his profits or if the Washington Post runs a story about 
unconscionable profits in an Army RCI venture. 
In his “Military Housing Privatization Initiative:  Background and Issues” Daniel 
Else comments that Budget Scoring, especially the $0 score associated with real property, 
is subject to reinterpretation by OMB. (Else, 2001)  In all of its sites, Army RCI trades its 
real property for equity in a corporation or partnership.  It can do this because its real 
property has no budgetary impact. If OMB significantly changes these scores, it could 
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profoundly affect the methods DoD in general and the Army specifically uses to 
revitalize its military housing.   
In its original version, Army RCI permitted housing to be built to local standards.  
Donald Spigelmyer, Army RCI Program Manager, commented that higher-level 
intervention forced his program to standardize construction standards. (Spigelmyer, 
2003)  Adopting the standards probably drives up building costs in areas where building 
standards are less strict.   Worse, the standardization may set a precedent that restricts 
local RCI offices’ ability to adapt the program to meet local conditions.   
Kristine Lawrence commented that the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management has already stated that profits from the richer sites—those with 
high BAH, e.g., Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir, Monterey, and Hawaii, should be used to 
subsidize the poorer sites, e.g., Fort Polk, developing a nationwide minimum standard for 
Army housing.  (Lawrence, 2003)  Such a plan reduces the incentives for individual sites 
to control costs.     
It also leads the Army into the morass of defining a nationwide minimum housing 
standard.  Theoretically, BAH reflects local housing costs.  It does not necessarily reflect 
the cost to rent the same house at each site.  It is entirely possible that the housing 
standard in Monterey is higher than in Fort Polk.  It might be difficult to explain to the 
populace around Fort Polk (and their Congressional delegation) that Army families have 
nicer homes than does the general public because Monterey, Fort Belvoir, and Fort 
Meade raise the Army’s standard.   
Such a plan also has the effect of redistributing BAH after Congress has endorsed 
the standards for various locations around the country.  Congress and taxpayers might 
justly conclude that if the entire BAH is not required to pay for housing in and around 
Fort Meade or Monterey, then perhaps the BAH for such sites ought to be lowered.   
3. BAH 
RCI depends on the value of its land and buildings and on BAH.  The President 
and Congress have agreed to increase BAH until the average service member’s out-of-
pocket expenses for housing are zero.  Thereafter, BAH must keep pace with housing 
costs.  If, because of a budget crunch, change of administration, or any other reason, 
BAH does not keep pace with housing costs; then the economics of RCI fall apart.  For 
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example, the Corporation relies on BAH for much of its income.  If BAH disappears, 
declines, or does not keep pace with housing costs; the Corporation’s balance sheet 
changes.  As the difference between BAH and actual housing costs increases, the 
financial health of RCI corporations could be affected adversely. 
As the difference between BAH and actual costs increases, service members’ will 
have fewer housing choices.  Competition among housing sources in Monterey is 
important to the success of RCI in Monterey.  If service members do not have adequate 
funding, that competition disappears, and they will feel compelled to live in Corporation 
housing, regardless of its quality.  Under such circumstances, there is little incentive for 
the Corporation to maintain high construction and maintenance standards.  
4. Cost Plus Percentage of Cost 
The RCI Program Financial/Fee Information, included in Appendix C, describes 
the Development Management Fee as “. . .between 3% and 5% of the total development 
costs.  The amount included in total development costs will be agreed upon during the 
development of the CDMP. . .”  Similarly, the Construction Management fee is “. . .3% 
to 6% of the total hard cost of construction.  A material portion of this fee should be 
performance based.  The amount included in total hard cost will be agreed upon during 
the development of the CDMP for the project.”  If this were a Government contract, it 
would come dangerously close to an illegal cost plus percentage of cost contract. 
The important issue is not whether the contract is illegal but whether it is 
advisable.  Cost plus percentage of cost contracts encourage a contractor to run up costs 
in order to increase his fee.  RCI’s fees are not based on actual costs; they are based on 
projected costs.  So, instead of encouraging a contractor to incur actual costs, RCI 
encourages a contractor to inflate his cost estimates during the preparation of the CDMP.  
The incentives in the fees also encourage the contractor to inflate his estimates.  When 
the contractor incurs less than his estimates, he earns incentives for cost under runs.  
Without competition, there are no other contractors’ estimates with which the winning 
contractor’s estimates can be compared.  It is not clear that the Government had or used 
cost analysts to consider the contractor’s estimates, as it would with a sole source 
contract nor is there any evidence that the Government prepared an independent cost 
estimate.      
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5. Fifty Years 
Rental housing takes a long time to earn a return on investment because of the 
considerable costs of land and of construction.  Costs will vary by site.  So, the break-
even point will vary by site and by the ancillary facilities and the level of maintenance.  
Given the agree-upon costs in a CDMP, it should be possible to calculate the point at 
which construction costs are recouped.  It is difficult to justify continuing a 
noncompetitive relationship with a builder beyond that point, but RCI uses a standard 
fifty-year agreement with a twenty-five year option.  Property management is a different 
issue.   Given that the threat of competition encourages innovation and cost control, a 
variety of incentive arrangements, options, award terms are available.   
With shorter-term arrangements, the Government can choose to renew a 
contractor with which it has built an excellent working relationship or not renew a 
troublesome contractor.  With a fifty-year arrangement, the Government does not have 
the option of not renewing.  Because this is not a contractual relationship, normal 
Government contracting termination procedures do not apply.     
J. BEST PRACTICES 
Regardless of whether the final instrument is a Government contract, other 
transaction, or a public-private corporation; the marketplace has developed some basic 
principles.  Acquisition personnel understand these principles, but RCI does not rely on 
the Army’s acquisition community.  Worse, even it chooses not to use the Army 
acquisition community to execute its agreements, there appears to be no excuse for not 
tapping acquisition’s vast experience.  Although RCI uses some of acquisition’s forms 
and procedures, e.g., formal source selection and alpha contracting, it ignores some of 
acquisition’s basic principles  
1. Competition 
Competition works.  It lowers prices.  It increases innovation.  It keeps everyone 
sharp.  Price competition alone can result in shoddy products or services.  In contrast, 
technical competition alone can result in gold-plated products and services.  Balancing 
technical excellence against cost produces the best deal.  RCI conducted a technical 
competition for military housing in Monterey, but it did not consider price as a factor.  
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We can be confident that RCI selected a technically competent corporate partner.  But 
RCI cannot credibly claim that it got the best price or the best value.   
The FAR requires a contracting officer to certify that a contract price is fair and 
reasonable—a price that a prudent man would pay in a competitive environment.  In our 
private dealings, we all want to be sure that we pay a fair and reasonable price.  RCI’s 
corporations are not Government contracts, but taxpayers still have a right to expect that 
the Army will manage its funds and other resources prudently.  Even if we are confident 
that RCI will produce attractive livable neighborhoods, we cannot be sure that it 
produced them for a fair and reasonable price.    
2. Subject Matter Expertise   
The Army Corps of Engineers has considerable expertise in planning and 
managing large construction projects.  Donald Spigelmyer, the Army’s PM for RCI, 
worked for the Corps of Engineers before joining the Task Force which developed RCI.  
We find occasional references to the Corps of Engineers in literature about Army family 
housing.  There is even a Corps of Engineers website dealing with RCI, but it has not 
been updated for years.  Although the Army RCI PM writes all first-step Requests for 
Qualifications, the Baltimore District of the Corps of Engineers issues them.   
Strikingly, that appears to be the extent of the Corps’ current involvement in RCI.  
We have seen organizational rivalries doom programs, but the stakes in RCI are huge.  If 
RCI accomplishes the Army’s goal of revitalizing all its deteriorating housing, it will be a 
$7 billion dollar program.  Ignoring the Corps of Engineers expertise in construction 
oversight and management increases program risk unacceptably.    
K. CONCLUSION 
RCI will work at the sites where there is considerable competition from private-
sector housing.  At those sites the commercial marketplace will force the RCI 
corporations to produce and maintain acceptable family housing.  Otherwise, Army 
families, armed with adequate BAH, will choose to live elsewhere.  In Monterey, given 
its very high BAH, RCI may produce showplace military communities, like the artist’s 
renderings included herein.    
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RCI’s success at more isolated sites is less certain.  RCI corporations may have 
incentives to produce the required number of family housing units; but the quality of the 
housing, maintenance, and associated amenities is likely to be lower.  Government 
participation in the corporations will tend to keep quality at an acceptable level, 
mitigating the worst abuses of the monopolies.  But without competition, it seems certain 












































Figure 5 – 6:  Artist’s Rendering of High Mission, FGO’s Quarters 
 
Source:  from the Monterey RCI website 
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APPENDIX A.  DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BAQ    Basic Allowance for Quarters. 
BAH    Basic Allowance for Housing. 
CDMP    Community Development Management Plan   
MFH Military Family Housing.  Housing units provided 
specifically for military family occupancy, including units 
obtained under section 801/802 and units owned and 
operated by DoD and funded through MILCON 
appropriations. 
MHPI Military Housing Privatization Initiative 
MILCON Military Construction.  Appropriations funding for major 
projects such as bases, schools, maintenance and storage 
facilities, and military family housing.  
OMC Ord Military Community 
PAM Portfolio and Asset Management 
PPV Public Private Venture.  The Navy’s program for 
privatizing housing under MHPI. 
Privatized Housing Housing units made available to rent to military families 
under the Military Housing Privatization Act. 
RCI Residential Communities Initiative.  The Army’s program 
for privatizing housing under MHPI. 
RFQ Request for Qualifications.  The “solicitation” the Army 
issues to invite interested parties to submit qualifications 





















Figure A - 1:  Architect’s Elevation of the La Mesa Recreation Center 
 
 
Source:  From Monterey RCI website 
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APPENDIX B – 1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
1996 Defense Authorization Act 
Public Law 104-106 110 Stat 186 
Signed by President Clinton on Saturday, February 10, 1996. 
One Hundred Fourth Congress 
of the  
United States of America 
At the Second Session 
 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the third day of 
January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six 
 
S1124 
Thurmond S. (R-SC), 01/26/96, (32488 lines) 
Enrolled (finally passed both houses)  
AN ACT 
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1996 for military activities of the 
Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the 
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
Forces, to reform acquisition laws and information technology management of the 
Federal Government, and for other purposes.  
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled,  
 
TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS 
SUBTITLE A--MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE  
Sec. 
2871. Definitions. 
2872. General authority. 
2873. Direct loans and loan guarantees. 
2874. Leasing of housing to be constructed. 
2875. Investments in non-governmental entities. 
2876. Rental guarantees. 
2877. Differential leases payments. 
2878. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities. 
2879. Interim leases. 
2880. Unit size and type. 
2881. Ancillary supporting facilities. 
2882. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units. 
2883. Department of Defense Housing Funds. 
2884. Reports. 




TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION 
AND IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
Sec. 
2871. Definitions. 
2872. General authority. 
2873. Direct loans and loan guarantees. 
2874. Leasing of housing to be constructed. 
2875. Investments. 
2876. Rental guarantees. 
2877. Differential lease payments. 
2878. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities. 
2879. Interim leases. 
2880. Unit size and type. 
2881. Ancillary supporting facilities. 
2882. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units. 
2883. Department of Defense Housing Funds. 
2884. Reports. 
2885. Expiration of authority. 
 
AMENDMENTS 
1999 - Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(h)(2), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 
Stat. 849, added item 2875 and struck out former item 2875 ''Investments in 
nongovernmental entities''.  
 
SUBCHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
















10 USC Sec. 2871 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2871. Definitions 
In this subchapter:   
(1) The term ''ancillary supporting facilities'' means facilities related to military 
housing units, including facilities to provide or support elementary or secondary 
education, child care centers, day care centers, tot lots, community centers, housing 
offices, dining facilities, unit offices, and other similar facilities for the support of 
military housing. 
 
(2) The term ''base closure law'' means the following: 
(A) Section 2687 of this title. 
(B) Title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 
Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). 
(C) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title 
XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). 
 
(3) The term ''construction'' means the construction of military housing units and 
ancillary supporting facilities or the improvement or rehabilitation of existing units or 
ancillary supporting facilities. 
 
(4) The term ''contract'' includes any contract, lease, or other agreement entered 
into under the authority of this subchapter. 
 
(5) The term ''eligible entity'' means any private person, corporation, firm, 
partnership, company, State or local government, or housing authority of a State or local 
government. 
 
(6) The term ''Fund'' means the Department of Defense Family Housing 
Improvement Fund or the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing 
Improvement Fund established under section 2883(a) of this title. 
 
(7) The term ''military unaccompanied housing'' means military housing intended 
to be occupied by members of the armed forces serving a tour of duty unaccompanied by 
dependents. 
 
(8) The term ''United States'' includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
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(Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 
Stat. 544; amended Pub. L. 105-261, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 




1999 - Pars. (5) to (8). Pub. L. 106-65 added par. (5) and redesignated former 
pars. (5) to (7) as (6) to (8), respectively. 1998 - Par. (1). Pub. L. 105-261 inserted 
''facilities to provide or support elementary or secondary education,'' after ''including''. 
 
10 USC Sec. 2872 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2872. General authority 
In addition to any other authority provided under this chapter for the acquisition 
or construction of military family housing or military unaccompanied housing, the 
Secretary concerned may exercise any authority or any combination of authorities 
provided under this subchapter in order to provide for the acquisition or construction by 
eligible entities of the following: 
(1) Family housing units on or near military installations within the United States 
and its territories and possessions. 
(2) Military unaccompanied housing units on or near such military installations. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 545; Amended Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(b), Oct. 5, 1999, 
113 Stat. 849.) 
 
AMENDMENTS 













10 USC Sec. 2873 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2873. Direct loans and loan guarantees 
 (a) Direct Loans. - (1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may 
make direct loans to an eligible entity in order to provide funds to the eligible entity for 
the acquisition or construction of housing units that the Secretary determines are suitable 
for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing. 
(2) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with 
respect to loans made under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
protect the interests of the United States, including the period and frequency for 
repayment of such loans and the obligations of the obligors on such loans upon default. 
(b) Loan Guarantees. - (1) Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary concerned may 
guarantee a loan made to an eligible entity if the proceeds of the loan are to be used by 
the eligible entity to acquire, or construct housing units that the Secretary determines are 
suitable for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing. 
(2) The amount of a guarantee on a loan that may be provided under paragraph (1) 
may not exceed the amount equal to the lesser of - 
(A) the amount equal to 80 percent of the value of the project; 
or 
(B) the amount of the outstanding principal of the loan. 
(3) The Secretary concerned shall establish such terms and conditions with 
respect to guarantees of loans under this subsection as the Secretary considers appropriate 
to protect the interests of the United States, including the rights and obligations of 
obligors of such loans and the rights and obligations of the United States with respect to 
such guarantees. 
(c) Limitation on Direct Loan and Guarantee Authority. – Direct loans and loan 
guarantees may be made under this section only to the extent that appropriations of 
budget authority to cover their cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5))) are made in advance, or authority is otherwise 
provided in appropriation Acts. If such appropriation or other authority is provided, there 
may be established a financing account (as defined in section 502(7) of such Act (2 
U.S.C. 661a(7))), which shall be available for the disbursement of direct loans or 
payment of claims for payment on loan guarantees under this section and for all other 
cash flows to and from the Government as a result of direct loans and guarantees made 
under this section. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 545; amended Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(c), Oct. 5, 1999, 
113 Stat. 849.) 
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AMENDMENTS: 1999 - Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(c)(1), substituted ''an 
eligible entity'' for 'persons in the private sector'' and ''the eligible entity'' for ''such 
persons''.  Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(c)(2), substituted ''an eligible entity'' 
for ''any person in the private sector'' and ''the eligible entity'' for ''the person''. 
 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 2883 of this title. 
 
10 USC Sec. 2874 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2874. Leasing of housing to be constructed 
(a) Build and Lease Authorized. - The Secretary concerned may enter into 
contracts for the lease of military family housing units or military unaccompanied 
housing units to be constructed under this subchapter. 
(b) Lease Terms. - A contract under this section may be for any period that the 
Secretary concerned determines appropriate and may provide for the owner of the leased 
property to operate and maintain the property. 
 
(Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 
Stat. 546.) 
 
10 USC Sec. 2875 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2875. Investments 
(a) Investments Authorized. - The Secretary concerned may make investments in 
an eligible entity carrying out projects for the acquisition or construction of housing units 
suitable for use as military family housing or as military unaccompanied housing. 
(b) Forms of Investment. - An investment under this section may take the form of 
an acquisition of a limited partnership interest by the United States, a purchase of stock or 
other equity instruments by the United States, a purchase of bonds or other debt 
instruments by the United States, or any combination of such forms of investment. 
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(c) Limitation on Value of Investment. - (1) The cash amount of an investment 
under this section in an eligible entity may not exceed an amount equal to 33 1/3 percent 
of the capital cost (as determined by the Secretary concerned) of the project or projects 
that the eligible entity proposes to carry out under this section with the investment. 
(2) If the Secretary concerned conveys land or facilities to an eligible entity as all 
or part of an investment in the eligible entity under this section, the total value of the 
investment by the Secretary under this section may not exceed an amount equal to 45 
percent of the capital cost (as determined by the Secretary) of the project or projects that 
the eligible entity proposes to carry out under this section with the investment. 
(3) In this subsection, the term ''capital cost'', with respect to a project for the 
acquisition or construction of housing, means the total amount of the costs included in the 
basis of the housing for Federal income tax purposes. 
(d) Collateral Incentive Agreements. - The Secretary concerned shall enter into 
collateral incentive agreements with eligible entities in which the Secretary makes an 
investment under this section to ensure that a suitable preference will be afforded 
members of the armed forces and their dependents in the lease or purchase, as the case 
may be, of a reasonable number of the housing units covered by the investment. 
(e) Congressional Notification Required. - Amounts in the Department of Defense 
Family Housing Improvement Fund or the Department of Defense Military 
Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund may be used to make a cash investment 
under this section in an eligible entity only after the end of the 30-day period beginning 
on the date the Secretary of Defense submits written notice of, and justification for, the 
investment to the appropriate committees of Congress. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 546; amended Pub. L. 105-85, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2805, Nov. 18, 1997, 
111 Stat. 1991; Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(d), (h)(1), Oct. 5, 1999, 
113 Stat. 849.) 
 
AMENDMENTS 
1999 - Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(h)(1), struck out ''in nongovernmental entities'' 
after “'Investments'' in section catchline.  Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(d)(1), 
substituted ''an eligible entity'' for ''nongovernmental entities''.  Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 106-
65, Sec. 2803(d)(2), substituted ''an eligible entity'' for ''a nongovernmental entity'' in 
pars. (1) and (2) and ''the eligible entity'' for ''the entity'' wherever appearing in pars. (1) 
and (2).  Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(d)(3), substituted ''eligible'' for 
''nongovernmental''.  Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 106-65, Sec. 2803(d)(4), substituted ''an eligible 
entity'' for ''a nongovernmental entity''. 1997 - Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 105-85 added subsec. 
(e). 
 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS: This section is referred to in section 






10 USC Sec. 2876 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2876. Rental guarantees 
The Secretary concerned may enter into agreements with eligible entities that 
acquire or construct military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing 
units under this subchapter in order to assure - 
(1) the occupancy of such units at levels specified in the agreements; or 
(2) rental income derived from rental of such units at levels specified in the 
agreements. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 546; amended Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(e), Oct. 5, 1999, 
113 Stat. 849.) 
 
AMENDMENTS 
1999 - Pub. L. 106-65 substituted ''eligible entities'' for ''private persons'' in 
introductory provisions. 
 
10 USC Sec. 2877 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2877. Differential lease payments 
Pursuant to an agreement entered into by the Secretary concerned and a lessor of 
military family housing or military unaccompanied housing to members of the armed 
forces, the Secretary may pay the lessor an amount in addition to the rental payments for 
the housing made by the members as the Secretary determines appropriate to encourage 
the lessor to make the housing available to members of the armed forces as military 
family housing or as military unaccompanied housing. 
 
(Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 
547; amended PL 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(f), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 849.) 
 
AMENDMENTS: 1999 - Pub. L. 106-65 substituted ''a lessor'' for ''a private lessor''. 
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10 USC Sec. 2878 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2878. Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities 
 (a) Conveyance or Lease Authorized. - The Secretary concerned may convey or 
lease property or facilities (including ancillary supporting facilities) to eligible entities for 
purposes of using the proceeds of such conveyance or lease to carry out activities under 
this subchapter. 
(b) Inapplicability to Property at Installation Approved for Closure. - The 
authority of this section does not apply to property or facilities located on or near a 
military installation approved for closure under a base closure law. 
(c) Terms and Conditions. - (1) The conveyance or lease of property or facilities 
under this section shall be for such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as 
the Secretary concerned considers appropriate for the purposes of this subchapter and to 
protect the interests of the United States. 
(2) As part or all of the consideration for a conveyance or lease under this section, 
the purchaser or lessor (as the case may be) shall enter into an agreement with the 
Secretary to ensure that a suitable preference will be afforded members of the armed 
forces and their dependents in the lease or sublease of a reasonable number of the 
housing units covered by the conveyance or lease, as the case may be, or in the lease of 
other suitable housing units made available by the purchaser or lessee. 
(d) Inapplicability of Certain Property Management Laws. – The conveyance or 
lease of property or facilities under this section shall not be subject to the following 
provisions of law: 
(1) Section 2667 of this title. 
(2) The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 471 
et seq.). 
(3) Section 321 of the Act of June 30, 1932 (commonly known as the Economy 
Act) (40 U.S.C. 303b). 
(4) Section 501 of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
11411). 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 547; amended Pub. L. 105-85, div. A, title X, Sec. 1073(a)(60), Nov. 18, 1997, 
111 Stat. 1903; Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2803(g), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 
849.) 
 
REFERENCES IN TEXT 
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, referred to in 
subsec. (d)(2), is act June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377, as amended. Provisions of the 
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Act relating to management and disposal of Government property are classified to 
chapter 10 (Sec. 471 et seq.) of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works. For 
complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 
471 of Title 40 and Tables. 
 
AMENDMENTS:  1999 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 106-65 substituted ''eligible entities'' for 
''private persons''. 1997 - Subsec. (d)(4). Pub. L. 105-85 substituted ''11411'' for ''11401''. 
 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS:  This section is referred to in 
sections 2883, 2884 of this title. 
 
10 USC Sec. 2879 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2879. Interim leases 
Pending completion of a project to acquire or construct military family housing 
units or military unaccompanied housing units under this subchapter, the Secretary 
concerned may provide for the interim lease of such units of the project as are complete. 
The term of a lease under this section may not extend beyond the date of the completion 
of the project concerned. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 547.) 
 
10 USC Sec. 2880 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2880. Unit size and type 
 (a) Conformity With Similar Housing Units in Locale. – The Secretary concerned 
shall ensure that the room patterns and floor areas of military family housing units and 
military unaccompanied housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter are 
generally comparable to the room patterns and floor areas of similar housing units in the 
locality concerned.   
(b) Inapplicability of Limitations on Space by Pay Grade. –  
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(1) Section 2826 of this title shall not apply to military family housing units 
acquired or constructed under this subchapter. 
(2) The regulations prescribed under section 2856 of this title shall not apply to 
any military unaccompanied housing unit acquired or constructed under this subchapter 
unless the unit is located on a military installation. 
 
(Added PL 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 548.) 
 
10 USC Sec. 2881 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2881. Ancillary supporting facilities 
 (a) Authority To Acquire or Construct. - Any project for the acquisition or 
construction of military family housing units or military unaccompanied housing units 
under this subchapter may include the acquisition or construction of ancillary supporting 
facilities for the housing units concerned. 
(b) Restriction. - A project referred to in subsection (a) may not include the 
acquisition or construction of an ancillary supporting facility if, as determined by the 
Secretary concerned, the facility is to be used for providing merchandise or services in 
direct competition with - 
(1) the Army and Air Force Exchange Service; 
(2) the Navy Exchange Service Command; 
(3) a Marine Corps exchange; 
(4) the Defense Commissary Agency; or 
(5) any nonappropriated fund activity of the Department of Defense for the 
morale, welfare, and recreation of members of the armed forces. 
 
(Added PL 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 548; 
amended PL 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2804, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 849.) 
 
AMENDMENTS:  1999 - PL 106-65 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), 










10 USC Sec. 2882 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2882. Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units 
 (a) In General. - The Secretary concerned may assign members of the armed 
forces to housing units acquired or constructed under this subchapter. 
(b) Effect of Certain Assignments on Entitlement to Housing Allowances. - (1) 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), housing referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
considered as quarters of the United States or a housing facility under the jurisdiction of a 
uniformed service for purposes of section 403 of title 37. 
(2) A member of the armed forces who is assigned in accordance with subsection 
(a) to a housing unit not owned or leased by the United States shall be entitled to a basic 
allowance for housing under section 403 of title 37. 
(c) Lease Payments Through Pay Allotments. - The Secretary concerned may 
require members of the armed forces who lease housing in housing units acquired or 
constructed under this subchapter to make lease payments for such housing pursuant to 
allotments of the pay of such members under section 701 of title 37. 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 548; amended Pub. L. 105-85, div. A, title VI, Sec. 603(d)(2)(C), Nov. 18, 
1997, 111 Stat. 1783.) 
 
AMENDMENTS: 1997 - Subsec. (b)(1). PL 105-85, Sec. 603(d)(2)(C)(i), substituted 
''section 403'' for ''section 403(b)''.  Subsec. (b)(2). PL 105-85, Sec. 603(d)(2)(C)(ii), 
substituted ''basic allowance for housing under section 403 of title 37'' for ''basic 
allowance for quarters under section 403 of title 37 and, if in a high housing cost area, a 
variable housing allowance under section 403a of that title''. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1997 AMENDMENT:  Amendment by PL 105-85 effective Jan. 
1, 1998, see section 603(e) of PL 105-85, set out as a note under section 5561 of Title 5, 













10 USC Sec. 2883 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
  
Sec. 2883. Department of Defense Housing Funds 
 (a) Establishment. - There are hereby established on the books of the Treasury 
the following accounts: 
(1) The Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund. 
(2) The Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement 
Fund. 
(b) Commingling of Funds Prohibited. - (1) The Secretary of Defense shall 
administer each Fund separately. 
(2) Amounts in the Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund 
may be used only to carry out activities under this subchapter with respect to military 
family housing. 
(3) Amounts in the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied Housing 
Improvement Fund may be used only to carry out activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military unaccompanied housing. 
(c) Credits to Funds. - (1) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense 
Family Housing Improvement Fund the following: 
(A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund. 
(B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of Defense transfers, 
in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from amounts authorized 
and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or construction of 
military family housing. 
(C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities under section 
2878 of this title for the purpose of carrying out activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military family housing. 
(D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter with respect to 
military family housing, including interest on loans made under section 2873 of this title, 
income and gains realized from investments under section 2875 of this title, and any 
return of capital invested as part of such investments. 
(E) Any amounts that the Secretary of the Navy transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2814(i)(3) of this title, subject to the restrictions on the use of the transferred 
amounts specified in that section. 
(2) There shall be credited to the Department of Defense Military Unaccompanied 
Housing Improvement Fund the following: 
(A) Amounts authorized for and appropriated to that Fund. 
(B) Subject to subsection (f), any amounts that the Secretary of Defense transfers, 
in such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts, to that Fund from amounts authorized 
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and appropriated to the Department of Defense for the acquisition or construction of 
military unaccompanied housing.  
(C) Proceeds from the conveyance or lease of property or facilities under section 
2878 of this title for the purpose of carrying out activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military unaccompanied housing. 
(D) Income derived from any activities under this subchapter with respect to 
military unaccompanied housing, including interest on loans made under section 2873 of 
this title, income and gains realized from investments under section 2875 of this title, and 
any return of capital invested as part of such investments. 
(E) Any amounts that the Secretary of the Navy transfers to that Fund pursuant to 
section 2814(i)(3) of this title, subject to the restrictions on the use of the transferred 
amounts specified in that section. 
(d) Use of Amounts in Funds. –  
(1) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as provided in 
subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department of Defense 
Family Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities under this subchapter with 
respect to military family housing, including activities required in connection with the 
planning, execution, and administration of contracts entered into under the authority of 
this subchapter. The Secretary may also use for expenses of activities required in 
connection with the planning, execution, and administration of such contracts funds that 
are otherwise available to the Department of Defense for such types of expenses.  
(2) In such amounts as provided in appropriation Acts and except as provided in 
subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense may use amounts in the Department of Defense 
Military Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund to carry out activities under this 
subchapter with respect to military unaccompanied housing, including activities required 
in connection with the planning, execution, and administration of contracts entered into 
under the authority of this subchapter. The Secretary may also use for expenses of 
activities required in connection with the planning, execution, and administration of such 
contracts funds that are otherwise available to the Department of Defense for such types 
of expenses. 
(3) Amounts made available under this subsection shall remain available until 
expended. The Secretary of Defense may transfer amounts made available under this 
subsection to the Secretaries of the military departments to permit such Secretaries to 
carry out the activities for which such amounts may be used.  
(e) Limitation on Obligations. - The Secretary may not incur an obligation under a 
contract or other agreement entered into under this subchapter in excess of the 
unobligated balance, at the time the contract is entered into, of the Fund required to be 
used to satisfy the obligation. 
(f) Notification Required for Transfers. - A transfer of appropriated amounts to a 
Fund under paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of subsection (c) may be made only after the end 
of the 30-day period beginning on the date the Secretary of Defense submits written 
notice of, and justification for, the transfer to the appropriate committees of Congress. 
(g) Limitation on Amount of Budget Authority. - The total value in budget 
authority of all contracts and investments undertaken using the authorities provided in 
this subchapter shall not exceed- 
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(1) $850,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military family housing; 
and 
(2) $150,000,000 for the acquisition or construction of military unaccompanied 
housing. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 
548; amended Pub. L. 104-201, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2804, Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 
2788; Pub. L. 106-65, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2802(b), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 848.) 
 
AMENDMENTS:  1999 - Subsec. (c)(1)(E). PL 106-65, Sec. 2802(b)(1), added subpar. 
(E). Subsec. (c)(2)(E). PL 106-65, Sec. 2802(b)(2), added subpar. (E).  1996 - Subsec. 
(d)(1), (2). PL 104-201 inserted at end ''The Secretary may also use for expenses of 
activities required in connection with the planning, execution, and administration of such 
contracts funds that are otherwise available to the Department of Defense for such types 
of expenses.'' 
 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS: This section is referred to in 
sections 2814, 2854a, 2871, 2884 of this title. 
 
10 USC Sec. 2884 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2884. Reports 
(a) Project Reports. - (1) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report describing - 
(A) each contract for the acquisition or construction of family housing units or 
unaccompanied housing units that the Secretary proposes to solicit under this subchapter; 
and 
(B) each conveyance or lease proposed under section 2878 of this title. 
(2) The report shall describe the proposed contract, conveyance, or lease and the 
intended method of participation of the United States in the contract, conveyance, or 
lease and provide a justification of such method of participation. The report shall be 
submitted not later than 30 days before the date on which the Secretary issues the 
contract solicitation or offers the conveyance or lease. 
(b) Annual Reports. - The Secretary of Defense shall include each year in the 
materials that the Secretary submits to Congress in support of the budget submitted by the 
President pursuant to section 1105 of title 31 the following: 
(1) A report on the expenditures and receipts during the preceding fiscal year 
covering the Funds established under section 2883 of this title. 
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(2) A methodology for evaluating the extent and effectiveness of the use of the 
authorities under this subchapter during such preceding fiscal year. 
(3) A description of the objectives of the Department of Defense for providing 
military family housing and military unaccompanied housing for members of the armed 
forces. 
 
 (Added Pub. L. 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 
110 Stat. 550.) 
 
FINAL REPORT:  Section 2801(b) of Pub. L. 104-106 provided that: ''Not later than 
March 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees (Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives) a report on the use by the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretaries of the military departments of the authorities provided by subchapter IV of 
chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a). The report shall 
assess the effectiveness of such authority in providing for the construction and 
improvement of military family housing and military unaccompanied housing.'' 
 
10 USC Sec. 2885 01/23/00 
TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law 
PART IV - SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT 
CHAPTER 169 - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING 
SUBCHAPTER IV - ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING 
 
Sec. 2885. Expiration of authority 
The authority to enter into a contract under this subchapter shall expire on 
February 10, 2001. 
 
(Added PL 104-106, div. B, title XXVIII, Sec. 2801(a)(1), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 551; 
amended PL 105-85, div. A, title X, Sec. 1073(a)(61), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1903.) 
 
AMENDMENTS:  1997 - PL 105-85 substituted ''on February 10, 2001'' for ''five years 
after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1996''. 
 
THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS AMENDED THE HOUSING 
PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION WHEN THEY WERE ENACTED AS PART OF 
H.R. 5408, THE FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 





SEC. 2805. PROVISION OF UTILITIES AND SERVICES UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION AND IMPROVEMENT OF 
MILITARY HOUSING. 
(a) AUTHORITY TO FURNISH ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS- Subchapter IV 
of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2872 
the following new section: 
 
Sec. 2872a. Utilities and services 
(a) AUTHORITY TO FURNISH- The Secretary concerned may furnish utilities 
and services referred to in subsection (b) in connection with any military housing 
acquired or constructed pursuant to the exercise of any authority or combination of 
authorities under this subchapter if the military housing is located on a military 
installation. 
(b) COVERED UTILITIES AND SERVICES- The utilities and services that may 
be furnished under subsection (a) are the following: 
(1) Electric power. 
(2) Steam. 
(3) Compressed air. 
(4) Water. 
(5) Sewage and garbage disposal. 
(6) Natural gas. 
(7) Pest control. 
(8) Snow and ice removal. 
(9) Mechanical refrigeration. 
(10) Telecommunications service. 
(c) REIMBURSEMENT- (1) The Secretary concerned shall be reimbursed for 
any utilities or services furnished under subsection (a). 
(2) The amount of any cash payment received under paragraph (1) shall be 
credited to the appropriation or working capital account from which the cost of furnishing 
the utilities or services concerned was paid. Amounts so credited to an appropriation or 
account shall be merged with funds in such appropriation or account, and shall be 
available to the same extent, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as such 
funds.'. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of such 
subchapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2872 the following 
new item: 
2872a. Utilities and services.'. 
 
SEC. 2806. EXTENSION OF ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACQUISITION 
AND IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY HOUSING. 
Section 2885 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking `February 10, 










Figure B – 1:  Artist’s Rendering of the Ord Military Community Town Hall  
 
Source:  from the Monterey RCI website 
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APPENDIX C.  RCI INCENTIVE FEES  
 
RCI PROGRAM FINANCIAL / FEE INFORMATION 
December 2002 
 
The Army understands that rates of return differ based on a number of variables. 
For purposes of evaluating Statements of Qualifications provided in response to 
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) solicitations, an industry standard range of fees 
is provided below. These fees will not be considered in isolation and will in no way be a 
determinant of actual fees or fee structures negotiated during the Community 
Development Management Plan (CDMP).  Developers are encouraged to exercise 
creativity in crafting both their fee structure and organization structure in order to 
maximize funds available for improving the quality of life for soldiers and their families. 
1.  Property/Asset Management - The Army expects that there will be a fee or series of 
fees associated with the property management and asset management as in the private 
sector. However the developer describes the fees associated with the management of 
the operations of the project and the operations of the entity for the project, the Army 
expects that, when combined, the fee(s) will be in a range of 3 to 5 of gross rent for 
available units less vacant units. Moreover, a material portion of this/these fee(s) 
should be performance based. In addition, given DOD's zero out of pocket BAH 
initiative, the Army expects there to be a mechanism built into this fee structure that 
will guard against "windfall profits" going to the developer as related to this initiative. 
 
2.  Development Management - The Army expects a development management fee 
structure that will range between 3 and 5 of the total development costs. The amount 
included in total development costs will be agreed upon during  the development of 
the CDMP for the project as will the reimbursement, if any, associated with the 
development staff for the project. The entire development fee should be at risk to the 
developer in the event that the scope milestones, agreed upon prior to closing, are 
 not achieved due to events within the developer's control. 
3.  Construction Management - The Army expects that the fee paid to the general 
contractor will be within a range of 3 to 6 of the total hard cost of construction. A 
material portion of this fee should be performance based. The amount included in 
total hard cost will be agreed upon during the development of the CDMP for the 
project. The Army expects that the annual reimbursement of direct costs associated 
with the construction (i.e., general conditions and/or overhead) will be evaluated and 










4.  Other Fees - The fees listed above are intended to cover the full array of services 
provided by the selected developer and accordingly the Army does not expect to pay 
any other fees to the selected developer out of project funds. In the event that the 
selected developer has another fee proposed, it will be included and evaluated within 
one of the three categories listed above. 
 
5.  Return on Invested Equity - Any cash split proposed by the developer should be 
treated as the mechanism for the developer to receive a return on his at-risk equity. If 
there is no contributed equity, the developer should not expect to receive a share of 
excess cash flow. The developer will be expected to propose a return on his invested 
equity that is consistent with the risk and duration associated with his investment in 
this project. The Army does not believe that the risk of capital invested in these 
projects is commensurate with the equity risk associated with residential development 
in the private sector. The Army expects the offerer to include a cap on the annual 
return on investment the developer expects to receive. Caps based on statistics such as 
"internal rate of return" are not appropriate given the long-term nature of the ground 
leases. 
 
6.  Summary - The information provided above is intended to assist the offerer in 
responding to a Request For Qualifications (RFQ). The Fees and Return on Invested 
Equity will be reviewed and evaluated both individually and in their entirety for 
comparison purposes during the selection process and ranked according to the overall 
financial impact that the proposal has on the project. The selected developer from the 
RFQ process should expect that, as with all other aspects of their RFQ plan for the 
project, that the specific details, including the final amount of each fee, will be 
concluded during the CDMP phase. For additional Program Information, contact the 










INCENTIVE FEE STRUCTURE 
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE 
Revision 4: 23 August 2002 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this paper is to establish the process and metrics of the 
Property Management Incentive Fee Structure. 
BACKGROUND 
The Property Management Incentive Fee is part of the overall property 
management fee structure. The maximum Incentive Fee portion is 2% of net rental 
income. The Incentive 
Fee portion is significant and is equal to 40% of the total property management 
fee available to be earned by Picerne Management /FM. LLC. The Incentive Fee will be 
awarded on a quarterly basis. 
The Incentive Fee is calculated on a monthly basis at a full 2 and on a monthly 
basis the fee amount is placed into the Property Management Fee Reserve Account. At 
the end of the quarter, the incentive fee process is implemented and then approximately 
thirty days following the end of the quarter, the Trustee releases all or a portion of the 
Incentive Fee for the previous quarter as earned by Picerne Management /FM. Any 
unearned fee for the previous quarter is then placed into the Construction Revenue 
Account as a contribution to capital sources. 
STATUS 
The CDMP outlined four metrics for measurement that have been revised by the 
Management Council. The revised new metrics now total five and measure customer 
service, maintenance response, occupancy, budget, and quality of life. Each of the 
metrics is weighted equally at 20 and is measured on a quarterly basis. 
PROCESS 
The incentive fee metrics will be measured and summarized, under the direction 
of the Installation Commander, within 20calendar days following the end of each quarter. 
The results of each quarterly measurement process will be made available to Picerne 
Management /FM. Following the measurement period, the Commander has 8 days to 
finalize the award amount and submit the signed award to Picerne Management /FM for 
payment processing through the Trustee. 
Incentive Fee Metrics 
1.  Customer Service: The customer service metric will be valuated through 
 resident survey. Picerne Management will send surveys by mail to 25% of the 
occupied homes (different 25% each quarter).  The surveys will be sent in equal 
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proportion to each of neighborhoods in accordance with their respective 
occupancy. The estimated number of surveys to be mailed to residents in 
 October 2002 is projected to be 500 based on occupancy of 2,000 homes.  Of  
 The 500 surveys, 100 will be executed by the Resident Liaison Office by  
 telephone or door-to-door. Additionally, the surveys will be available on the 
Meade-Picerne website. Each survey will have a control number that the  
 resident can enter into the computer to fill out the survey online. 
 The survey will have ten questions ratable on a scale of 1 to 10 relating to 
neighborhood appearance, management services, and maintenance services. 
 Additionally, the survey will have five climate questions pertaining to quality of 
life that will be scored with the fifth metric. Lastly, there will be five additional 
open-ended and non-scored questions to obtain feedback beyond the ratable 
questions. To encourage residents to complete surveys, Picerne Management 
 /FM will offer six $100 cash prizes via a drawing conducted by the Resident 
Liaison Office. 
 The 20% for the first metric will be awarded on a pro rata basis from a base rating 
of 6.5. If Picerne Management /FM receives an average overall score of 6.5 or 
higher, the full 20% for this metric will be credited to Picerne Management /FM. 
A score of less than 6.5 will be calculated as a percentage of the 20%. For 
example, a rating of 5.0 would be 77% of the potential 100% (6.5). As a result 
Picerne Management /FM would receive 15% for the first metric (of the 20% 
potential). 
2.    Maintenance Service: The maintenance service metric will be evaluated based on 
Picerne Management /FM's completion of maintenance requests. The CDMP 
 provides three categories of maintenance services: emergency, urgent, and 
 routine. Each category will have an individual listing of tasks and will have an 
 average completion response time associated with the category.  Picerne 
 Management /FM will track all requests through its Yardi work order system. At 
 the end of each quarter. Picerne Management /FM will compile the maintenance 
 service data and present it to the Resident Liaison Office who may test the data. 
 A full 20 portion of the second metric will be awarded if Picerne Management 
 /FM meets or exceeds an 85 average response completion time on an 
 aggregate category basis.   As per the customer service metric, Picerne 
 Management /FM can receive something less than 20 for this metric based on 
 the same pro rata computation. 
3.  Financial: The financial metric is based on actual operating expenses versus 
 budgeted operating expenses. Picerne Management /FM will receive a full 20 
 for this metric if it operates within plus or minus five percent of the budget for 
 controllable  expenses.  Controllable  expenses  are  payroll,  supplies, 
 administration, maintenance, insurance, and advertising and marketing, and 
 miscellaneous operating expenses. Expenses excluded from the calculation are 
 utilities and management fee.   Events beyond the control of Picerne 
 Management /FM that cause the budget to be exceeded shall be taken into 
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 account.  Such events include but are not limited to, labor shortages, strikes,              
severe weather, acts of nature, material cost spikes, etc. If actual operating 
expenses exceed the budget, a portion of the 20% for this metric will be received 
 by Picerne Management /FM based on a similar pro rata computation as the first 
 metric. 
4.  Occupancy: The occupancy metric is based on actual occupancy versus 
 budgeted occupancy for the quarterly period. Picerne Management /FM will 
 receive a full 20 for this metric if occupancy meets or exceeds the budgeted 
 occupancy. If actual occupancy falls below the budget, a portion of the 20 for 
 this metric will be received by Picerne Management /FM based on a similar pro 
 rata computation as the first metric. 
 
5.  Quality of Life: The quality of life metric is based on the five quality of life 
 resident survey questions. The questions are similar to those surveyed in the 
 ARMY'S annual housing survey. The five questions are also rated on a 1 to 10 
 scale. 
 
 The 20% for this last metric will be awarded on a pro rata basis from a base rating 
of 6.5. Surveys not returned will be designated as "satisfied customer" with a 7.5 
rating. If Picerne Management /FM receives an average overall score of 6.5 or 
higher, the full 20% for this metric will be credited to Picerne Management /FM.  
A score of less than 6.5 will be calculated as a percentage of the 20%.  For 
example, a rating of 5.0 would be 77% of the potential 100% (6.5). As a result, 
 Picerne Management /FM would receive 15% for the last metric (of the 20% 
potential). 
 
The five metrics listed above are intended to serve as quantitative measurements 
of Picerne Management /FM's property management performance. Final award of the 
Incentive Fee is subject to review and adjustment by the Installation Commander. All 



























Figure C - 1:  Artist’s Rendering of Neighborhood Center in Monterey 
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Figure D - 1:  Artist’s Rendering of Greek Revival, Junior NCO’s Quarters 
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